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WEALTH, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND DUE PROCESS
BRANDON L. GARRETT*
ABSTRACT
Increasingly, constitutional litigation challenging wealth in-
equality focuses on the intersection of the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses. That intersection—between equality and due
process—deserves far more careful exploration. What I call “equal
process” claims arise from a line of Supreme Court and lower court
cases in which wealth inequality is the central concern. For example,
the Supreme Court in Bearden v. Georgia conducted analysis of a
claim that criminal defendants were treated differently based on
wealth in which due process and equal protection principles con-
verged. That equal process connection is at the forefront of a wave of
national litigation concerning some of the most pressing civil rights
issues of our time, including: the constitutionality of fines, fees, and
costs; detention of immigrants and criminal defendants for inability
to pay cash bail; loss of voting rights; and a host of other ways in
which the indigent face both unfair process and disparate burdens.
I argue that an intersectional “equal process” approach to these cases
better reflects both longstanding constitutional doctrine and the
practical stakes in such litigation. If courts properly understand this
connection between inequality and unfair process, they will design
more suitable and effective remedies. More broadly, scholars have
bemoaned how the Court turned away from class-based heightened
scrutiny in equal protection doctrine. Equal process theory has the
potential to reinvigorate the Fourteenth Amendment as a guardian
* L. Neil Williams, Jr. Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Many thanks
to Kerry Abrams, Matthew Adler, Daniel Bowes, Beth Colgan, Lisa Foster, Jed Purdy,
Stephen Sachs, and Sneha Shah for invaluable comments on earlier drafts, as well as par-
ticipants at a constitutional law lunch at Duke Law. © Brandon L. Garrett, 2019.
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against unfair process and discrimination that increases inequality
in society.
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INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, constitutional litigation challenging wealth in-
equality focuses on the intersection of the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses. Most prominent, perhaps, was the discussion in
Obergefell v. Hodges in Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion
of the “profound” connection between equality and due process.1 The
Court relied on prior cases in making such a connection explicit.
Those included fundamental rights equal protection cases, such as
Zablocki v. Redhail, involving the right to marry, as well as cases
such as Lawrence v. Texas, involving findings of animus, in which
rational basis review has had “teeth.”2 Few noticed, however, that
the Obergefell Court began its discussion of equality and due process
by citing to a seemingly inapposite line of cases that includes
Bearden v. Georgia.3 In Bearden, in an opinion by Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor, the Court held that the trial judge could not revoke
a defendant’s probation for failure to pay a fine and victim restitu-
tion without making findings that either he had the ability to pay
or that alternative forms of punishment would not satisfy state
interests.4 The Bearden Court explained that where the state judge
both used inadequate process, and, as a result, disparately subjected
the poor to imprisonment, “[d]ue process and equal protection
principles converge in the Court’s analysis.”5 What does a ruling
about probation and criminal fines have to do with marriage
equality? In this Article, I describe how the reliance on the ne-
glected Bearden ruling in Obergefell was no accident. The approach
in Bearden, long considered marginal and relevant only to certain
1. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602-03 (2015). The Court elaborated: 
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a
profound way, though they set forth independent principles. Rights implicit in
liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and
are not always co-extensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to
the meaning and reach of the other.
Id.
2. Id. at 2603-04 (first citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-87, 398 (1978); then
citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575, 578 (2003)).
3. Id. at 2602-03 (citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983)).
4. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672-73.
5. Id. at 665.
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access-to-courts issues, now lies at the center of the jurisprudence
of wealth inequality under the Constitution.6
This Article explores the constitutional intersection between
equality and procedural due process. The Equal Protection Clause
provides that no state shall deny to a person “the equal protection
of the laws.”7 The Supreme Court has held that this prohibition on
discrimination bars a state from “punishing a person for his
poverty,”8 and it has condemned the “evil” of “discrimination against
the indigent.”9 However, in the well-known school funding case of
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Court
ruled that wealth disparities leading to funding inequities do not
receive strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.10 Many
scholars have observed that the Rodriguez ruling, and related
rulings, pose an obstacle to a class-conscious Equal Protection
Clause.11 The Court has suggested economic class is not a suspect
6. See, e.g., Colin Reingold, Pretextual Sanctions, Contempt, and the Practical Limits of
Bearden-Based Debtors’ Prison Litigation, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 361, 362 (2016) (“Today,
Bearden is invoked in courtrooms throughout America to protest when judges attempt to jail
a defendant for reasons that directly or indirectly stem from poverty.”); see also Note, State
Bans on Debtors’ Prisons and Criminal Justice Debt, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1024, 1027-31 (2016)
(describing the importance of Bearden claims but also the value of state law debtors’ prison
bans).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671.
9. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
10. 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973) (“[T]his Court has never heretofore held that wealth dis-
crimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny.”); see also Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (“[T]his Court has held repeatedly that poverty, standing
alone, is not a suspect classification.”).
11. See, e.g., Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 1277, 1281-82 (1993); Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of
Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 629 (2008);
see also Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Disparate Treatment of Race and Class
in Constitutional Jurisprudence, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Fall 2009, at 109, 111-14 (argu-
ing that the Court has engaged with economic rights only “tangentially” in part due to “the
Court’s miserly determination of the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny”); Michael Klarman,
An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 285-91 (1991)
(describing the general Burger Court turn from fundamental rights protection for economic
rights, due to concerns with redistributive consequences); Alec Schierenbeck, The Con-
stitutionality of Income-Based Fines, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1869, 1925 (2018); Cass R. Sunstein,
Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2005).
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class.12 Yet wealth disparities do still receive careful equal protec-
tion scrutiny, just not based on equal protection alone.13
Instead, due process also plays a role. Mirroring the language of
the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that a state shall not “deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”14 The focus of
procedural due process case law is on assuring that a person re-
ceives meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard—to prevent
arbitrary and unfair process.15 Such cases develop procedures to
ensure that actors such as judges do not deny benefits or take action
against a person without fairly considering a person’s ability to
pay.16 What I call “equal process” claims arise from the line of
Supreme Court and lower court cases in which wealth inequality is
the central concern. In cases such as Bearden, the Supreme Court
does not apply equal protection strict scrutiny.17 However, the
combined concern with wealth inequality and unfair process results
in a constitutional violation.18 In still other cases, equal protection
and substantive due process play a role where fundamental rights
are implicated by government action.19
That “equal process” connection between wealth, equality, and
due process is at the forefront of a wave of national litigation
concerning the constitutionality of fines, fees, cash bail, and other
ways in which the indigent lose important rights.20 Almost every
state increased the cost of fines and fees in recent years.21 In
12. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666 n.8 (“When the court is initially considering what sentence
to impose, a defendant's level of financial resources is a point on a spectrum rather than a
classification. Since indigency in this context is a relative term rather than a classification,
fitting ‘the problem of this case into an equal protection framework is a task too Procrustean
to be rationally accomplished.’” (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969))).
13. For early arguments that both substantive due process and equal protection warrant
constitutional protection for the poor, see Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Con-
stitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5 (1987); and Frank I.
Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term: Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 17, 33 (1969).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
15. See infra Part I.A.
16. See infra Part I.A.
17. See 461 U.S. at 666-67.
18. See id. at 672-74.
19. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107, 120-21 (1996).
20. See infra Part II.
21. State-by-State Court Fees, NPR (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/
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response, litigation is pending in Alabama, California, Georgia,
Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Pennsyl-
vania, Virginia, and many more localities.22 Take, for example, a rul-
ing regarding bail-setting in Dallas, Texas.23 A federal judge ordered
Dallas County courts to provide meaningful hearings before jailing
people.24 The lead plaintiff in the lawsuit was charged with misde-
meanor shoplifting, and she could not pay bail set at $500.25 Her
hearing lasted about twenty seconds, and, as a transgender person,
she was sent to twenty-four-hour solitary confinement in a men’s
facility.26 The judge found such hearings unconstitutional, in part
based on videos showing the hearings typically lasted under thirty
seconds but resulted in detention lasting for days, weeks, or even
months.27
In this Article, I argue that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment should be understood holistically as part of a structure
designed to ensure citizenship (and the rights thereof) and gov-
ernment’s duties to persons. Courts should not divorce equality
concerns from concerns regarding procedural and substantive fair-
ness, particularly when powerful liberty, property, and life interests
are at stake. This understanding fits with an approach the U.S.
Supreme Court has adopted in a range of doctrines. Kerry Abrams
and I have developed how the Court engages in what we term “cu-
mulative” constitutional analysis of several different types, includ-
ing intersectional analysis, in which two constitutional rights
bolster and inform each other.28
05/19/312455680/state-by-state-court-fees [https://perma.cc/4VA6-7HKF].
22. For descriptions of pending litigation, see infra Part II.
23. See Julieta Chiquillo & Cary Aspinwall, Dallas County’s Bail System Is Unfair to the
Financially Challenged, Federal Court Rules, DALLAS NEWS (Sept. 20, 2018, 7:37 PM),
https://www. dallasnews.com/news/courts/2018/09/20/federal-court-orders-dallas-county-make-
individual-assessments-before-setting-bail [https://perma.cc/UPN9-ELHC].
24. Id.
25. See Jolie McCullough, Poor Inmates Sue Dallas County over Bail System Following
Harris County Ruling, TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/
2018/01/22/following-harris-county-ruling-poor-inmates-sue-dallas-county-over-bail/
[https://perma. cc/9P3S-YY4C].
26. Id.; Mustafa Z. Mirza, Dallas County’s Secret Bail Machine, MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept.
4, 2018, 3:47 PM), https://themarshallproject.org/2018/09/04/dallas-county-s-secret-bail-ma
chine [https://perma.cc/U932-R4XK].
27. Chiquillo & Aspinwall, supra note 23.
28. Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 B.U. L.
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Equal process claims are an important, but little-noticed, example
of that intersectional analysis. Part II develops how equal protection
process claims are prominent in litigation that challenges pretrial
bail decision-making, driver’s license revocation, costs and fees, and
Department of Justice government consent decrees that concern
fines and fees, such as the one negotiated in Ferguson, Missouri.29
Lower and appellate courts are split over whether to treat practices
that disproportionately burden the poor as due process or equal
protection claims. Some federal courts have already misunderstood
the constitutional claims to be solely procedural due process in na-
ture, and, as a result, judges have neglected the class-based equality
dimension. Other judges have misunderstood the claims as solely
equal protection claims, receiving only rational basis scrutiny, and
have not considered the procedural fairness dimension. Treating
these claims as equal protection claims, judges correctly note that
heightened scrutiny does not currently apply to wealth-discrimina-
tion claims. Treating these claims as procedural due process claims,
judges may find a minimal hearing adequate in some circumstances.
But when judges have properly understood these as equal process
claims, courts have followed the reasoning of cases such as Bearden
correctly and understood unfair process to raise far greater consti-
tutional concerns when it centers on wealth inequality. Getting the
equal process connection right will be crucial as these access-to-
justice questions are litigated.
Part III describes how a series of important constitutional
doctrines and rulings have neglected the connection between process
and inequality in outcomes. Fundamental rights equal protection
cases provide another important type of intersectional cumulative
analysis. The Court’s decision in Obergefell could have also benefit-
ted from equal process reasoning.30 The absence of discussion of
procedural rights and wealth-based concerns made the ruling’s
significance uncertain outside of categorical same-sex marriage
bans. Others, such as Cary Franklin, have focused on how the Court
REV. 1309, 1310 (2017). That article briefly discussed the Bearden line of cases as an example
of the connection between equal protection and due process cases. Id. at 1345.
29. See infra Part II.C. (describing Department of Justice “equal process” remedies).
30. See Abrams & Garrett, supra note 28, at 1334-37, for a detailed discussion and
critique of the Obergefell ruling and its failure to explain the connection drawn between equal
protection and due process claims and cases.
2019] WEALTH, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND DUE PROCESS 405
has neglected wealth-based concerns in the fundamental rights
cases concerning abortion, or how the Court, more broadly, has ne-
glected equality concerns in abortion cases.31 The Supreme Court’s
Trump v. Hawaii travel ban ruling did not address procedural due
process claims raised in the litigation. Although it was not wealth,
but rather religion- and nationality-based discrimination at issue,
an equal process approach could have impacted the analysis in the
case.
More broadly, equal process theory can help to address the long-
standing concern that the Fourteenth Amendment does not suf-
ficiently address class-based discrimination.32 There is cause for
more optimism than is often expressed.33 The connection between
procedural due process and equality is increasingly prominent in
litigation.34 However, the Supreme Court is not eager to develop
substantive due process law and is unlikely to expand fundamental
rights protection.35 The equal process line of cases is a more prom-
ising area to develop the law. Another reason to focus on the in-
tersection between procedural due process and equality is that it
gets at the heart of an urgent, practical problem: indigent people
often suffer from both (1) arbitrary decision-making and inadequate
access to courts, as well as, (2) the unequal outcomes that result.36
A new generation of litigation is making equal process relevant as
income inequality has increased in society and as awareness that
fines, fees, bail, and other decisions dramatically disadvantage the
poor. That said, there are real shortcomings of equal process case
law. I discuss how equal process cases have largely failed to address
the race disparities in challenged government practices, and why
31. See Cary Franklin, The New Class Blindness, 128 YALE L.J. 2, 47-69 (2018).
32. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (“[T]his Court has held repeatedly that
poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification.”); Klarman, supra note 11, at 283-84;
see also Henry Rose, The Poor as a Suspect Class Under the Equal Protection Clause: An Open
Constitutional Question, 34 NOVA L. REV. 407, 408 (2010).
33. But see Cary Franklin, The New Class-Blindness, LAW & POL. ECON. (Aug. 2, 2018),
https://lpeblog.org/2018/08/02/the-new-class-blindness/ [https://perma.cc/6W9M-U3YC]
(“[H]oldings that explicitly vindicate the constitutional rights of people without financial
resources remain rare, and that rarity bolsters the widespread perception that Fourteenth
Amendment law offers virtually no protection against class-based discrimination.”).
34. See infra Part III.
35. See infra Part III.
36. See infra Part I.A.
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this reflects flaws in the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence.37
A final reason why the connection between equality and due
process is important is that in an era of widening inequality more
regulation both contributes to inequality and may be enacted to
address it.38 There is an urgent need for constitutional litigation to
address the intersection between arbitrariness and class. Equal
process claims lie at that intersection. Part III concludes by dis-
cussing implications of equal process for process theory and anti-
subordination theory of equal protection. Equal process claims
provide a satisfying combination of the two approaches. The
connection can bring out both equal protection concerns with status
and subordination and due process concerns with deprivation and
arbitrary treatment.
The equal process theory will increasingly matter as access-to-
justice litigation is brought to challenge unfair treatment of the
poor. However, this theory will also matter more if the government
makes available new social benefits to ensure that the poor are not
unfairly denied access. Wealth does matter under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The intersection between poverty and the criminal
justice system helps us to understand how. If courts understand
the equal process connection, then constitutional rights under both
equality and due process can effectively protect the poor from unfair
punishment.
I. WEALTH AND SECTION 1 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
While large bodies of constitutional law interpret and apply
individual clauses of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment—
including the Citizenship Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and
the Due Process Clause (but not the Privileges or Immunities
37. See generally Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Inclusion, Exclusion, and the “New” Economic
Inequality, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1647, 1650-51 (2016) (describing efforts to redress structural
inequality and questioning whether class-based approaches adequately address racial in-
equality).
38. Regarding empirical evidence of widening income inequality in the United States
and elsewhere, see, for example, ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE?
105 (2015); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 247-49 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 2014).
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Clause)—those clauses were understood to, at least in part, operate
together to ensure broad citizenship and larger equality in the
rights of all persons.39 To be sure, very different constitutional tests
are used in equal protection law versus due process law.40 The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment repeats the lang-
uage from the Fifth Amendment making it binding on the states.41
The Fifth Amendment language, in turn, stems from a longstanding
English tradition that judges link to the “law of the land” language
in the Magna Carta.42 The Equal Protection Clause was newly
adopted in the Fourteenth Amendment.43 However, concepts of
equality and due process are, and have long been, linked in theory
and in application to a wide range of social and governmental
practices.44 In some constitutional litigation, both equality and
procedural or substantive due process rights are implicated.45 That
connection is particularly important in cases in which wealth
matters. This connection is important because wealth is not subject
to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause and
because procedural unfairness can more severely impact indigent
people who do not have the same access to attorneys and other
aspects of the legal process. In the Sections that follow, I describe
first procedural due process rulings focusing on wealth, then equal
protection rulings, and, finally, how the two come together in equal
process rulings.
39. See infra Part I.C.
40. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Re-
lationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (1988)
(“Since its inception, the Equal Protection Clause has served an entirely different set of pur-
poses from the Due Process Clause.”).
41. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
42. See Francis W. Bird, The Evolution of Due Process of Law in the Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 37 (1913); see also Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 16 (1956) (“Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an
age-old problem. People have never ceased to hope and strive to move closer to that goal. This
hope, at least in part, brought about in 1215 the royal concessions of Magna Charta.”).
43. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
44. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, Equality and Unconstitutional Discrimination, in PHIL-
OSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 51, 51-53 (Deborah Hellman & Sophia
Moreau eds., 2013); Abrams & Garrett, supra note 28, at 1332; Kenneth L. Karst, The
Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 136-37
(2007).
45. See infra Part I.C.3.
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A. Procedural Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution forbids states
from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”46 In many contexts, litigants have challenged wealth
distinctions used by the State that affect liberty or property in-
terests.47 In some settings, other constitutional rights are also
implicated. For example, in Gideon v. Wainwright, in which the
Court held that a state must provide trial counsel for an indigent
defendant charged with a felony, both the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel and procedural due process were implicated.48 Indeed, in
one of the Court’s earliest constitutional criminal procedure rulings,
the Scottsboro Boys case of Powell v. Alabama, the Court relied on
both due process and equal protection in highlighting the rights of
indigent defendants.49
More recently, in a range of situations involving administrative
proceedings and challenges to the denial of government benefits, the
Supreme Court has followed the test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge,
asking a court to balance three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.50
That said, in other situations, the Court has highlighted a far
more traditional analysis, describing due process as “flexible” and
using an approach that “calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.”51 In the context of criminal procedure
rules in particular, the Court has sometimes stated that tradition
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
47. See, e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 12 (1979).
48. 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
49. 287 U.S. 45, 50 (1932).
50. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
51. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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and “fundamental fairness” define procedural due process, not a
Mathews cost-benefit analysis.52
In the context of government benefits that are particularly im-
portant, the analysis may call for quite a bit more process. Thus, in
Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court emphasized that welfare benefits pro-
vided “the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and
medical care” and therefore found that a full hearing must be
conducted before termination of benefits.53 In contrast, in Mathews,
the Court did not find the same exigency in the context of Social
Security disability benefits.54 In the context of drivers’ licenses, the
Court found violative a scheme in which an uninsured driver who
did not post security after an accident had a license suspended, fo-
cusing on the lack of an opportunity to be heard before suspension
occurred.55 The Court emphasized that there was a “substantial”
interest in being able to hold a valid driver’s license, which weighed
heavily in the analysis.56 
Another factor that is relevant to the private interest involved is
the duration of the deprivation.57 Longer deprivations may dispa-
rately affect indigent persons.58 Further, the deprivations may be
hard for the state to remedy. The Court emphasized in Mackey that
the state “will not be able to make a driver whole for any personal
inconvenience and economic hardship suffered by reason of any
delay in redressing an erroneous suspension through postsuspen-
sion review procedures.”59
Second, the Mathews analysis focuses on the risk of an errone-
ous deprivation. The Court has emphasized that: “The Due Process
52. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992). However, the Court has applied the
Mathews test to procedures for pretrial detention and involuntary civil commitment. See
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (plurality opinion); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,
330-31 (1993); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). The Court has also applied the
Mathews test to defense access to expert witnesses. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77
(1985) (citing fundamental fairness concerns as well).
53. 397 U.S. 254, 264, 270 (1970).
54. 424 U.S. at 349.
55. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539-42 (1971).
56. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1979) (“The duration of any potentially
wrongful deprivation of a property interest is an important factor in assessing the impact of
official action on the private interest involved.”); see Bell, 402 U.S. at 539.
57. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341.
58. Id. at 342.
59. 443 U.S. at 11.
410 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:397
Clause simply does not mandate that all governmental decision-
making comply with standards that assure perfect, error-free de-
terminations.”60
Third, the analysis asks what government interests justify the
relative lack of process provided. In Mackey, for example, where the
issue was summary suspension of drivers’ licenses for those who
refuse to take a breath-analysis test, the Court emphasized a strong
interest in public safety and compliance.61 
In a recent case applying the Mathews framework, Turner v.
Rogers, the Supreme Court found that civil detention for contempt
based on nonpayment of child support violated due process when
insufficient notice and fact-finding were conducted.62 Indeed, the
Court highlighted that the trial judge had not made a finding that
Turner had any ability to pay the owed child support, leaving that
part of the form blank before ordering him incarcerated.63
In a separate group of cases such as Boddie v. Connecticut, the
Supreme Court has found that making access to courts dependent
on ability to pay filing fees violates procedural due process.64 In
Boddie, the Court struck filing fees and court costs, approximately
$60, imposed for seeking a divorce.65 The Court noted that: “The
arguments for this kind of fee and cost requirement are that the
State's interest in the prevention of frivolous litigation is substan-
tial, its use of court fees and process costs to allocate scarce
resources is rational.”66 The Court noted the availability of alterna-
tive ways to secure that government interest though, such as
penalties for malicious filings.67
60. Id. at 13.
61. Id. at 18 (“The Commonwealth's interest in public safety is substantially served in
several ways by the summary suspension of those who refuse to take a breath-analysis test
upon arrest. First, the very existence of the summary sanction of the statute serves as a de-
terrent to drunken driving. Second, it provides strong inducement to take the breath-analysis
test and thus effectuates the Commonwealth's interest in obtaining reliable and relevant
evidence for use in subsequent criminal proceedings. Third, in promptly removing such
drivers from the road, the summary sanction of the statute contributes to the safety of public
highways.”).
62. 564 U.S. 431, 447-48 (2011).
63. Id. at 449.
64. 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
65. Id. at 372, 374.
66. Id. at 381.
67. Id. at 381-82.
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The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause, there-
fore, does not ensure full and free access to courts, but where im-
portant individual interests are at stake (such as marriage dissolu-
tion rights) and where the state has created a monopoly on the
ability to access that interest, the ability to pay cannot be unduly
relied upon.68 This type of procedural due process analysis plays an
important role in the modern wave of fines and fees litigation, but
with an equally important equal protection component.
B. Wealth and Equal Protection
The Supreme Court’s opinion in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez addressed a claim that wealth-based classifi-
cations should receive heightened scrutiny under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.69 The case involved a challenge to a school funding
scheme that relied on local tax revenue.70 The Court explained that
heightened scrutiny had been warranted in prior rulings when “the
class discriminated against ... because of their impecunity ... [was]
completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a conse-
quence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful
opportunity to enjoy that benefit.”71 In a five-to-four decision, the
Court denied relief in the case, finding that reduced school funding
in less wealthy districts did not constitute such an absolute dep-
rivation.72 The Court highlighted that “at least where wealth is
involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute
equality or precisely equal advantages.”73 
At the time, commentators opined that further expansion of the
Equal Protection Clause to more closely scrutinize wealth categories
was inadvisable, because it would engage the Court in wealth
68. See id. at 374.
69. 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
70. For an excellent description of the background of the case, see Michael Heise, The
Story of San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez: School Finance, Local Control,
and Constitutional Limits, in EDUCATION LAW STORIES 51, 51-74 (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna
Greff Schneider eds., 2008); and Richard Schragger, San Antonio v. Rodriguez and the Legal
Geography of School Finance Reform, in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 85, 85-109 (Myriam E. Gilles
& Risa L. Goluboff eds., 2008).
71. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20.
72. Id. at 62.
73. Id. at 23-24.
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distribution, and because it would create extremely broad substan-
tive review of most legislation and regulations.74 In contrast, critics
of the ruling viewed it as a troubling missed opportunity—a case
where race and class were fundamentally connected; nowhere is
that connection more important than in education.75
That said, the Rodriguez opinion also addressed a separate
constitutional theory: the question of whether education was a
fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment.76 The Court
applied rational basis scrutiny and denied relief.77 In part for that
reason, Rodriguez does not stand for any general proposition that
wealth-based criteria do not receive heightened review under the
Equal Protection Clause. The Rodriguez Court did not say anything
categorical about either class discrimination or a fundamental right
to education.78 Indeed, one reason the Rodriguez Court denied relief
was that while the class of plaintiffs was varied and statewide, the
funding scheme did not clearly target an identifiable group of
indigent people.79 The Court explained:
An educational financing system might be hypothesized, how-
ever, in which the analogy to the wealth discrimination cases
[such as Griffin, Douglas, and Mayer] would be considerably
closer. If elementary and secondary education were made
available by the State only to those able to pay a tuition assessed
against each pupil, there would be a clearly defined class of
74. See Klarman, supra note 11, at 217, 285 (describing the Burger Court’s “judicial
overreaction to what many regarded as the dangerously open-ended potential” of fundamental
rights doctrine, alongside concern for the “potential for judicial wealth redistribution”); Ralph
K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SUP. CT.
REV. 41, 58.
75. See Gerald Torres, The Elusive Goal of Equal Educational Opportunity, in LAW AND
CLASS IN AMERICA: TRENDS SINCE THE COLD WAR 331, 335 (Paul D. Carrington & Trina Jones
eds., 2006); Camille Walsh, Erasing Race, Dismissing Class: San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, 21 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 133, 171 (2011).
76. 411 U.S. at 30 (“[T]he [mere] importance of a service performed by the State does not
determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under
the Equal Protection Clause.”); see also id. at 35 (“Education, of course, is not among the
rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis
for saying it is implicitly so protected. As we have said, the undisputed importance of ed-
ucation will not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a
State's social and economic legislation.”).
77. Id. at 6, 18.
78. See generally id.
79. See id. at 54-55.
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“poor” people—definable in terms of their inability to pay the
prescribed sum—who would be absolutely precluded from re-
ceiving an education. That case would present a far more com-
pelling set of circumstances for judicial assistance than the case
before us today.80
Note that in 1980, in Harris v. McRae, the Court noted that it “has
held repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect clas-
sification,” but cited a ruling that did not actually explicitly discuss
that question.81
Yet, in its later 1982 ruling in Plyler v. Doe, the Court applied
intermediate scrutiny to a Texas rule denying free public education
to school-aged children who did not have immigration status.82 As
Kerry Abrams and I have separately written, “Read instead as an
intersectional rights case, Plyler takes on a different cast. Although
the state has an interest in an educated population, the real interest
at stake is the interest of the children themselves.”83 Thus, Plyler
involves both equal protection and substantive due process inter-
ests, as “Plyler can be read as a case in which the equal protection
interest of undocumented children is read intersectionally with the
due process interest in obtaining an education, even while neither
interest on its own would merit heightened scrutiny.”84 
In a subsequent ruling in 1986, in Papasan v. Allain, the Court
found merit to an equal protection claim challenging Mississippi’s
sale of public lands held for the benefit of public schools in twenty-
three counties.85 The Court noted, “As Rodriguez and Plyler indicate,
this Court has not yet definitively settled the questions [of] whether
80. Id. at 25 n.60; see also Luke van Houwelingen, Tuition-Based All-Day Kindergartens
in the Public Schools: A Moral and Constitutional Critique, 14 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y
367, 375 (2007). One critique, however, is that the Court did not find the economic class
sufficiently narrowed based on class, when, as the Court acknowledged, it was, in fact, also
narrowed based on race. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 12 (“The residents are predominantly of
Mexican-American descent: approximately 90% of the student population is Mexican-
American and over 6% is Negro.”); see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on
Grounds Other than Race”: The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection
Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 699-700.
81. 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)).
82. See 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.16, 230 (1982).
83. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 28, at 1338.
84. Id.
85. See 478 U.S. 265, 286-87 (1986).
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a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right and wheth-
er a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe [upon] that right
should be accorded heightened equal protection review.”86 Rather
than challenging a state-wide school funding scheme, as in Rodri-
guez, this case centered on a single aspect of state policy and “a
state decision to divide state resources unequally among school
districts.”87
Compare, though, the result in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public
Schools where the Court upheld a $97 fee for bus service imposed on
an indigent child who lived sixteen miles from a public school, stat-
ing that because there was no fundamental right or category such
as sex or alienage involved, no equal protection violation occurred.88
Or, compare the result in McGinnis v. Royster, in which the Su-
preme Court rejected as satisfying a legislative rational basis
review, an equal protection challenge to a New York law that denied
“good time credit” from state prisoners who were jailed pretrial;
these prisioners argued that they were disadvantaged as compared
to those who could afford to make bail.89 Justice Douglas dissented,
calling this a “discrimination ... against those too poor to raise bail
and unable to obtain release on personal recognizance.”90 Moreover,
he noted a policy concern that detained people are far more likely to
be sentenced to prison, citing to studies of the pretrial process
conducted in the 1960s by the Vera Foundation.91 
Understanding why some cases such as Rodriguez and McGinnis
come out one way and a line of other cases come out a different way
helps one to understand both the limits of the Equal Protection
Clause in addressing government decision-making that disparately
affects the indigent and also why due process analysis can aid in the
analysis. In some cases the Supreme Court has insisted on equality
as to wealth, including situations when substantial individual
interests were at stake, such as education in Plyler v. Doe, or, in
other cases, marriage, and family decision-making.92 Thus, some of
86. Id. at 285.
87. Id. at 288.
88. See 487 U.S. 450, 461-63, 465 (1988).
89. See 410 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1973).
90. Id. at 280 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 282-83 (“Detained persons are more likely to be sentenced to prison than
bailed persons regardless of whether high or low bail amounts have been set.”).
92. See 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982).
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those cases touch on fundamental rights recognized under substan-
tive due process. For example, in Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court dis-
cussed an equal protection violation where the right to marry was
conditioned on full payment of any outstanding child custody.93 The
Court emphasized, however, that the statute “significantly interfer-
e[d]” with a fundamental right to marry and linked the analysis to
substantive due process rulings regarding “decisions relating to
procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships.”94
In criminal cases, judges have focused more directly on economic
status and class equality. In Williams v. Illinois, the Court stated:
“[T]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any
substantive offense be the same for all defendants irrespective of
their economic status.”95 In that case, an indigent person could not
pay the statutory fine and was kept an additional 101 days in jail,
because the judge treated each day as the equivalent of $5 to “work
out” the imposed fine.96 Similarly, in Tate v. Short, where a statute
imposed a fine, and the judge imprisoned an indigent person who
could not pay it, the Court held that “the Constitution prohibits the
State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically
converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is in-
digent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.”97 
Justice John Marshall Harlan had long disagreed with such
rulings in the way that they seemed to rely on equal protection
rather than due process.98 He concurred in Williams, arguing that
equal protection was not the right analysis but that the proper
approach was to rely on due process,99 and he dissented in Griffin.100
Justice Harlan’s point has real merit, since a significant component
of the concern is not with equality in outcomes but the fairness of
93. See generally 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
94. Id. at 386.
95. 399 U.S. 235, 244 (1970).
96. See id. at 236-37.
97. 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (quoting Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970)).
98. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 29 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
99. See 399 U.S. at 260 (Harlan, J., concurring in result) (“An analysis under due process
standards, correctly understood, is ... more conducive to judicial restraint than an approach
couched in slogans and ringing phrases ... that blur analysis by shifting focus away from the
nature of the individual interest affected.”).
100. See 351 U.S. at 29, 39 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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the process. Justice Harlan’s separate opinions may explain why
the Court eventually came to see that both equal protection and due
process should play a role in the analysis. Thus, in another group of
cases, to which I turn next, the Court adopted an approach at the
intersection of equal protection and due process.
C. Equal Protection and Due Process 
The Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause came
together in the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bearden v. Georgia.
There, the Court considered “whether the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits a State from revoking an indigent defendant’s probation
for failure to pay a fine and restitution.”101 The Supreme Court
explained in Bearden that “[d]ue process and equal protection
principles converge in the Court’s analysis” of cases where defen-
dants are treated differently and subject to criminal punishment
based on relative wealth.102 The Court noted that “we generally
analyze the fairness of relations between the criminal defendant
and the State under the Due Process Clause, while we approach the
question of whether the State has invidiously denied one class of
defendants a substantial benefit available to another class of
defendants under the Equal Protection Clause.”103 Before turning to
the facts and the ruling in Bearden, which are both worthy of
elaboration, it is useful to highlight what this analysis entails.
This type of analysis, relying on two separate constitutional
provisions, is what Kerry Abrams and I have called an intersec-
tional analysis. The Supreme Court has set out several types of
cumulative constitutional analyses, including aggregate harm
approaches, in which multiple discrete acts add up to a harm of
sufficient magnitude to receive constitutional relief, and hybrid
rights, in which the Court suggests that the presence of more than
one partial violation can result in relief.104 A third category of cu-
mulative constitutional rights, intersectional rights, “occurs when
the action ... violates more than one constitutional provision [but
101. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 661 (1983).
102. Id. at 665.
103. Id.
104. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 28, at 1310 (setting out three general types of cumu-
lative constitutional rights).
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only results in relief] when the Constitutional provisions are read
to inform and bolster one another.”105 Thus, a case such as Bearden
should not be seen as a case involving two separate constitutional
claims. Instead, the reasoning explains how two constitutional
claims are related and bolster each other. An intersectional
approach is not unusual, and many other examples can be docu-
mented across a range of constitutional rights.106 The bolstering
relationship between equal protection and procedural due process
is particularly well explained in Bearden and in the related line of
cases regarding punishment for inability to pay and access to
justice.107
1. The Bearden Ruling
The Bearden case involved a challenge by a man who had been
sentenced to probation and ordered to pay criminal fines of $500
and $250 in restitution.108 He was able to borrow $200 from his
parents, but, as an illiterate person with a ninth-grade education,
he had not been successful in his efforts to find employment.109 He
told his probation officer that he would not be able to make his next
payment on time, and the officer found him in violation.110 After an
evidentiary hearing before a trial judge, his probation was re-
voked.111 
The Bearden Court explained its ruling by highlighting both the
inequality inherent in incarcerating a person due to indigency and
also the inadequate procedures used by the trial judge: “Only if
alternative measures are not adequate to meet the State’s interests
in punishment and deterrence may the court imprison a probationer
who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay.”112 The Bearden
ruling also discussed that the state possessed alternatives that
would not so severely burden the poor.113 The majority noted that
105. Id. at 1313.
106. See id. at 1313-14.
107. See id. at 1345.
108. See 461 U.S. at 662-63.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 663.
112. Id. at 672.
113. See id. at 671-72.
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“the sentencing court could extend the time for making payments,
or reduce the fine, or direct that the probationer perform some form
of labor or public service in lieu of the fine.”114 The majority added
that a reduced fine or public service can adequately serve the state’s
interest in accomplishing deterrence and punishment.115 In the
manner of a procedural due process ruling, rather than an equal
protection ruling curing discriminatory treatment, the Court then
set out the process that a judge should apply in a parole revocation
hearing.116 The Court stated that if parole is to be revoked for failure
to pay a fine or restitution, then the judge must inquire into the
reason why the defendant failed to pay.117 If the reason was lack of
financial resources, then “alternative measures of punishment”
should be used, but if it was a willful failure to pay, then the judge
may revoke parole and sentence the defendant to further imprison-
ment.118 Citing to an equality concern with disparate treatment
based on wealth, Justice O’Connor wrote that “[t]o do otherwise
would deprive the probationer of his conditional freedom simply
because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine.”119 But
in the next sentence, in a reference to due process standards, Justice
O’Connor additionally wrote that “[s]uch a deprivation would be
contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”120
It is not just the need to examine procedural fairness that makes
the Due Process Clause relevant to the analysis, but also the non-
categorical nature of income inequality. Justice O’Connor notes that
financial resources are on a spectrum, as is the inequality created
by relying on inability to pay in incarcerating individuals.121 For
that reason, “[a] due process approach has the advantage in this
context of directly confronting the intertwined question of the role
that a defendant's financial background can play in determining an
appropriate sentence.”122 That reasoning helps to explain why an
114. Id. at 672.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 672-73.
117. Id. at 672.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 672-73.
120. Id. at 673.
121. See id. at 666 n.8.
122. Id. (“When the court is initially considering what sentence to impose, a defendant's
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equal process approach may be particularly well-suited to class-
based discrimination claims. Procedure and substance can both be
implicated by government conduct that is wealth-based.
In a wonderful passage, the Bearden Court explained: “Whether
analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue
cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis,
but rather requires a careful inquiry into” the government’s ends
and means, and the affected individual’s interests.123 This ruling
was not novel.124 The Court explained that it was not only “following
the framework” of prior rulings, such as Williams v. Illinois and
Tate v. Short, which adopted an equal protection analysis,125 the
Court was also “asking directly the due process question” regarding
whether the burden imposed was “fundamentally unfair or arbi-
trary” given the indigent person’s inability to pay the fine.126
Again, the inquiry is not just a Mathews v. Eldridge cost-benefit
procedural due process balancing, because it examines the individ-
ual interests on a spectrum depending on financial background and
ability to pay fines and fees.127 Importantly, however, the Court did
not conduct a typical Equal Protection Clause analysis either.128 For
example, the Court did not state what level of scrutiny it was ap-
plying.129 The Court did not suggest that it was departing from
Rodriguez and applying heightened scrutiny to class-based dis-
crimination.130 Instead, the result followed from the combination of
class-based harm and unfair and arbitrary procedures.131 It was an
intersectional and cumulative analysis.
The Bearden ruling provides a clear-eyed discussion of the ra-
tionale that operates across a line of decisions regarding access to
level of financial resources is a point on a spectrum rather than a classification. Since
indigency in this context is a relative term rather than a classification, fitting ‘the problem
of this case into an equal protection framework is a task too Procrustean to be rationally
accomplished.’” (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969))).
123. Id. at 666-67.
124. See id. at 665.
125. Id. at 665-67 (citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970) and Tate v. Short,
401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971)).
126. Id. at 666.
127. See id. at 674.
128. See id. at 666-67.
129. See id. at 665.
130. See id. at 672-73.
131. See id.
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courts that have developed at the intersection between equal pro-
tection and due process cases. The Court in Griffin v. Illinois held
that states cannot condition the right to appeal on a person’s ability
to afford the cost of a trial transcript.132 The Court held: 
It is true that a State is not required by the Federal Constitution
to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all.
But that is not to say that a State that does grant appellate
review can do so in a way that discriminates against some
convicted defendants on account of their poverty.133
2. Access to Justice and Other Equal Process Cases
The Bearden ruling grew out of a larger line of cases developing
similar reasoning. For example, in Draper v. Washington the Court
rejected a process in which the State only permitted an indigent to
obtain a free transcript of the trial if the trial judge agreed that the
contentions on appeal were not frivolous.134 The Court had also
struck down filing fees for state habeas corpus applications and the
process of seeking leave to appeal from a state supreme court.135 In
Douglas v. California, the Supreme Court went further, holding that
waiving fees to comply with Griffin is not enough: that counsel must
be provided to indigent convicts during their first appeal.136
As the Court later explained in Ross v. Moffitt, “[t]he precise ra-
tionale for the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases has never been
explicitly stated, some support being derived from the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the
Due Process Clause of that Amendment.”137 The Court noted that:
Neither Clause by itself provides an entirely satisfactory basis
for the result reached, each depending on a different inquiry
132. See 351 U.S. 12, 19-20 (1956).
133. Id. at 18 (citation omitted); see also Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97
(1971) (holding that the State could not deny a free transcript to an indigent defendant, which
constituted “a flat prohibition against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal
as would be available to others able to pay their own way”).
134. 372 U.S. 487, 499-500 (1963).
135. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 713-14 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 253
(1959).
136. 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
137. 417 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1974).
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which emphasizes different factors. “Due process” emphasizes
fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the
State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation
may be treated. “Equal protection,” on the other hand, empha-
sizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of
individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable.138
Cases in criminal settings adopted more deferential approaches
where the state already provided some meaningful level of access to
indigent defendants. In Ross v. Moffitt, the Court explained that
“[t]he duty of the State ... is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that
may be privately retained by a criminal defendant ... but only to
assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present
his claims fairly.”139 There, the Court found that while the state
must waive fees and provide counsel during appeals, petitioners in
subsequent discretionary post-conviction proceedings need not re-
ceive the same appointment of counsel.140 The Court relied not on
the due process clause, finding that sufficient process and access to
courts had been provided by the state during trial and appellate
stages, but instead focused on the claim that it was a denial of equal
protection to not provide an attorney post-conviction.141 On that bare
equal protection claim, the Court concluded that there was not
enough support for the argument that indigent post-conviction
petitioners were disadvantaged in the process.142 It is important to
note the difference in the analysis, as compared with cases such as
Douglas, Griffin, and Bearden. The Court only focused on one of the
two potentially applicable constitutional provisions and denied
relief.143
In James v. Strange, a case that has present-day implications
for debt collection practices, Justice Louis Powell, Jr. wrote an
opinion for the Court in 1972 finding that Kansas unconstitution-
ally imposed severe and punitive policies when engaging in debt
collection against former felons to recover costs of their indigent
138. Id. at 609.
139. Id. at 616.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 611 (finding that the “question is more profitably considered under an equal
protection analysis”).
142. Id. at 617-18.
143. Id. at 611, 617-18.
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representation.144 Without the exceptions that existed for other civil
debtors for necessary aspects of support such as food, fuel, transpor-
tation, and clothing, these practices, such as garnishment of wages
or welfare, made the treatment of indigent criminal defendants
unlike that of other classes of debtors.145 Using strong language,
Justice Powell wrote: “State recoupment laws, notwithstanding the
state interests they may serve, need not blight in such discrimina-
tory fashion the hopes of indigents for self-sufficiency and self-
respect.”146 Justice Powell concluded the opinion stating: “The
statute before us embodies elements of punitiveness and discrimina-
tion which violate the rights of citizens to equal treatment under the
law.”147 The focus was on equal protection, but the Court also relied
on due process cases regarding garnishment of wages of the
indigent, such as Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.148 In contrast,
in Fuller v. Oregon, the Court rejected a challenge to indigent
defense fees, where, after conviction, a defendant is able to pay the
fees, not relying on an equal process theory in that case.149
3. Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process
The same reasoning adopted in the Bearden line of cases con-
cerning equal protection and procedural due process claims sim-
ilarly applies when it is a substantive due process claim. In its 1996
ruling M.L.B. v. S.L.J., a case in which indigent mothers had to
prepay court costs for documents, including transcripts in the re-
cord, to appeal the termination of their parental rights, the Court
relied heavily on the Bearden line of cases.150 In an opinion by
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court explained that the cases do
not mean that wealth-based sanctions are impermissible when
they are “not merely disproportionate in impact,” but they are
impermissible when “they are wholly contingent on one’s ability to
144. 407 U.S. 128, 141-42 (1972).
145. Id. at 135.
146. Id. at 141-42.
147. Id. at 142.
148. Id. at 135-36 (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969)) (stating that
garnishment proceedings “impose tremendous hardship on wage earners with families to
support”).
149. 417 U.S. 40, 47-48 (1974). 
150. 519 U.S. 102, 127 (1996).
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pay.”151 That reasoning not only included a component focused on
the degree of deprivation, as in procedural due process cases, but
also the inequality with which that deprivation is imposed.152 It is
both an equality- and due process-based reasoning, and it applies
here not in a setting involving criminal punishment, but civil fees
regarding parental rights.153 The Court in M.L.B. strongly empha-
sized that it was not just in criminal punishment-related settings
that it questioned the ability to impose major consequences for
inability to pay.154 The Court noted that in Mayer v. City of Chicago,
the criminal conviction in question was a petty offense that carried
with it no jail time but did carry a fine.155 The problem with all such
statutes is that “they are wholly contingent on one’s ability to pay,”
and therefore impose consequences only on persons that fall within
the class of individuals that cannot pay.156 Moreover, the Court
noted that it opened no floodgates by applying this approach to
“cases typed ‘criminal,’” since the Court had already found that
parental rights implicate important personal interests.157
Thus, these equal process cases are not just about differential
wealth-based punishment of the poor. They include cases in both
civil and criminal contexts, as well as cases regarding access to
courts. Each category of cases implicates important individual
interests. The M.L.B. ruling makes clear that the equal process
claim is not strictly limited to the criminal setting, and it raises the
question whether other theories might similarly be amenable to the
approach. The next Part, however, discusses several examples of
areas in which the Court did not adopt such an approach, including
because there was not a sufficiently clear class-based distinction
being made.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 120.
153. Id. at 120-21.
154. Id. at 127-28.
155. Id. at 112. The case was “quasi criminal in nature.” Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S.
189, 196 (1971).
156. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 127.
157. Id.
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II. FINES, FEES, AND EQUAL PROCESS
A new wave of litigation promises to bring equal process claims
to the forefront in challenges against “new debtors’ prisons” and the
regulations, statutes, and discretionary decision-making that dis-
parately punish the poor. In the Sections that follow, I describe
litigation concerning topics such as pretrial detention and cash bail,
both for criminal defendants and noncitizen detainees; fines and
fees, including driver’s license revocation; and modern-day debtors’
prison litigation by the Department of Justice, such as the Ferguson
consent decree. I focus on the equal process reasoning adopted by
litigants and the lower courts, as well as failures to properly apply
the theory and why doing so can lead to unsound results when
courts erroneously dismiss civil rights lawsuits, when courts hand
plaintiffs victories, and when the remedies fail to ensure both
equality and fair process.
A. Litigation Challenging Pretrial Detention
Lower courts have long applied the equal process cases in a way
that has far-reaching consequences. For example, in Frazier v.
Jordan, in 1972, the Fifth Circuit stated that a local court may not
“constitutionally impose a sentence requiring an indigent defendant
to pay a fine forthwith or serve a specified number of days in jail,”
because unlike “[t]hose with means [to] avoid imprisonment[,] the
indigent cannot escape imprisonment.”158 In 1976, in Pugh v.
Rainwater, the Fifth Circuit en banc asked whether, “in the case of
indigents, equal protection standards require a presumption against
money bail” and “accept[ed] the principle that imprisonment solely
because of indigent status is invidious discrimination and not
constitutionally permissible.”159 The Fifth Circuit, there, rejected a
narrow view that the equal process line of cases applies only to
criminal punishment imposed after a conviction in favor of the
principle that imprisonment at any stage raises real constitutional
concerns (perhaps greater concerns), because such individuals
158. 457 F.2d 726, 726, 728 (5th Cir. 1972).
159. 572 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
2019] WEALTH, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND DUE PROCESS 425
“remain clothed with a presumption of innocence and with their
constitutional guarantees intact.”160 The panel recognized that
“[r]esolution of the problems concerning pretrial bail requires a
delicate balancing of the vital interests of the state with those of the
individual,” as the State “has a compelling interest in assuring the
presence at trial of persons charged with crime,” while individuals
are presumed innocent until proven guilty, and, therefore, retain
their constitutional rights.161 Relying on the equal process analysis
discussed here, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings in
Williams and Tate, the Court of Appeals concluded: “The demands
of equal protection of the laws and of due process prohibit depriving
pretrial detainees of the rights of other citizens to a greater extent
than necessary to assure appearance at trial and security of the
jail.”162 
A series of recent rulings have similarly involved challenges to
pre-trial detention and bail-related practices.163 The Fifth Circuit
recently ruled in ODonnell v. Harris County that the cash bail
system in Harris County, Texas, violated the due process clause,
because it adopted a “flawed procedural framework” in which judges
could set bail based on arbitrary and wealth-based criteria.164
However, an Eleventh Circuit ruling in Walker v. City of Calhoun,
distinguished that ruling, finding that sufficient individualized
process had been provided.165 Lower courts that have granted relief
have also focused on a Bearden-style equal process approach, rather
than exclusively focusing on a procedural due process analysis.166 
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1057.
163. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612, at *10-
11, *14 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016) (granting preliminary injunction enjoining city from man-
dating fixed-payment bail schedule); Thompson v. Moss Point, No. 1:15cv182LG-RHW, 2015
WL 10322003, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 16, 2015) (same).
164. 882 F.3d 147, 154 (5th Cir. 2018); see also Pierce v. City of Velda City, No. 4:15-cv-570-
HEA, 2015 WL 10013006, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015) (same).
165. 901 F.3d 1245, 1261 n.10 (11th Cir. 2018); see also Edwards v. Cofield, No. 3:17-CV-
321-WKW, 2018 WL 4101511, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 28, 2018) (denying both plaintiff ’s mo-
tion for preliminary injunction and defendants’ motion to dismiss in challenge to pretrial bail
practices); Buffin v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 15-cv-04959-YGR, 2018 WL 424362,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2018).
166. Schultz v. Alabama, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1359, 1376 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (distinguish-
ing Walker and granting a preliminary injunction to enjoin the practice of pretrial bail).
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In my view, the Fifth Circuit also focused too much on procedural
due process. The remedy specifically focused on process in the form
of requiring trial judges to render individualized, case-specific
findings.167 However, as John Monahan and I have written, that
remedy might not sufficiently eliminate troubling race- and income-
based disparities.168 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit ruling could lead to
greater disparities and worse outcomes. Nothing in the remedy
requires that trial judges monitor the patterns in outcomes pretrial,
examining whether race or income disparities persist or are
magnified.169 The equal process theory described here helps one to
understand what went wrong. The Fifth Circuit remedy is a
procedural due process remedy, and, as a result, it focused on the
process: asking trial judges to render individualized rulings.170 That
remedy does not ask that disparities be examined, and, as a result,
it does not take correct account of the equal process command of
Bearden. 
The same unequal result could occur in California, which has
passed state legislation to bar cash bail but permits individual
districts and judges to exercise complete discretion.171 Preserving a
right to a hearing without any attention to the equality of outcomes
that arise from that process provides only a hollow right that does
not take seriously the central Fourteenth Amendment concern that
grave individual rights not depend on one’s wealth. The focus should
remain both on equality and due process. 
Other litigation has challenged the use of ability to pay to
sentence criminal defendants. The Ninth Circuit has applied
Bearden to hold that judges must consider financial circumstances
before applying a U.S. Sentencing Guidelines enhancement based
on a failure to pay fines and fees.172 That remedy may better address
inequality than the Fifth Circuit’s ruling simply requiring more
167. See ODonnell, 882 F.3d at 545.
168. Brandon L. Garrett & John Monahan, Judging Risk 1-2 (Univ. Va. Sch. of Law Pub.
Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 2018-44, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3190403 [https://perma.cc/S4ZU-CX8S].
169. Id. at 40-41.
170. See ODonnell, 882 F.3d at 545.
171. Erwin Chemerinsky, This Is Not the Way to Reform California’s Bail System,
SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 22, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/op-ed/article217
018990.html [https://perma.cc/FSG8-7XJE].
172. United States v. Parks, 89 F.3d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1996).
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individualized attention to a case. However, absent ongoing analysis
of patterns in dispositions, that remedy may be inadequate as well.
Courts should consider ongoing monitoring and structural oversight
in settings in which both equality and due process are implicated by
patterns of inadequate individual decision-making.
Still additional litigation has challenged immigration detention
in which bail decisions similarly disparately affect indigent
persons.173 For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a preliminary
injunction in Hernandez v. Sessions by relying on a due process
analysis.174 The Court explained:
Given that the detainees have been determined to be neither
dangerous nor so great a flight risk as to require detention
without bond, the question before us is: Is consideration of the
detainees' financial circumstances, as well as of possible
alternative release conditions, necessary to ensure that the
conditions of their release will be reasonably related to the
governmental interest in ensuring their appearance at future
hearings? We conclude that the answer is yes.175
The ruling cited to due process case law, but also discussed Bearden
and court of appeals rulings such as Pugh v. Rainwater that adopt
an equal process approach.176 That ruling may have important
implications as the Trump Administration has changed its practices
to emphasize far greater use of detention for noncitizens.177 The
Ninth Circuit detailed the costs to immigrants of such detention:
“[T]he American Bar Association describes evidence of subpar
medical and psychiatric care in ICE detention facilities, the
economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a
result of detention, and the collateral harms to children of detainees
whose parents are detained.”178 Those are both procedural failings,
as well as substantive hardships imposed unequally based on
173. Hernandez v. Lynch, No. EDCV 16-00620-JGB (KKx), 2016 WL 7116611, at *1-2
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2016).
174. 872 F.3d 976, 990-91, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2017). 
175. Id. at 990.
176. Id. at 990-92.
177. For discussion, see Michael K.T. Tan & Michael Kaufman, Jailing the Immigrant
Poor: Hernandez v. Sessions, 21 CUNY L. REV. 69, 87-88 (2017).
178. Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995.
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citizenship and wealth categories. Ongoing monitoring of the
decision-making that results from the federal court ruling should
also occur in that context.
B. Litigation Challenging Fines and Fees
Another body of national litigation is challenging fines and fees
that disproportionately affect low-income people. One focus of that
litigation is rules in every state that permit suspension of drivers’
licenses for failure to pay traffic fees, failure to appear in court, and
other non-driving-related offenses.179 In 2016, the Department of
Justice recommended in a Dear Colleague Letter that states repeal
such laws.180 In many states, large swaths of the driving population
have driver’s license suspensions; a study found that over four
million people, or 17 percent of drivers in California, for example,
had such suspensions in 2013 (the state has now adopted legislation
that has ended the practice).181 A forthcoming study of North
Carolina drivers’ licenses is the first to conduct detailed empirical
analysis of state-level suspensions.182 That paper, by Will Crozier
179. Andrea M. Marsh, Rethinking Driver’s License Suspensions for Nonpayment of Fines
and Fees, NAT’L CTR. ST. CTS. (2017), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/Trends%
202017/Rethinking-Drivers-License-Suspensions-Trends-2017.ashx [https://perma.cc/5X63-
3853]; Mario Salas & Angela Ciolfi, Driven by Dollars: A State-by-State Analysis of Driver’s
License Suspension Laws for Failure to Pay Court Debt, LEGAL AID JUST. CTR. (2017), https://
www.justice4all.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Driven-by-Dollars.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W2UW-AATM]; see also Joseph Shapiro, How Driver’s License Suspensions Unfairly Target
the Poor, NPR (Jan. 5, 2015, 3:30 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/01/05/372691918/how-
drivers-license-suspensions-unfairly-target-the-poor [https://perma.cc/GK35-FRN4].
180. Letter from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. of the Civil
Rights Div. & Lisa Foster, Dir. of the Office of Access to Justice to Colleague (Mar. 14, 2016),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/subsite/mjc/docs/DOJDearColleague.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VAQ-
AB2J]; see also ALAN M. VOORHEES ET AL., MOTOR VEHICLES AFFORDABILITY AND FAIRNESS
TASK FORCE: FINAL REPORT xii (2006), https://www.state.nj.us/mvc/pdf/about/AFTF_final_02.
pdf [https://perma.cc/N2H9-6WXF] (describing a study of suspended drivers in New Jersey,
which found that 42 percent of people lost their jobs as a result of the driver’s license sus-
pension, that 45 percent could not find another job, and that this had the greatest impact on
seniors and low-income individuals).
181. LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, NOT JUST A FERGUSON PROBLEM: HOW TRAFFIC
COURTS DRIVE INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA 13-14 (2015), http://www.lccr.com/not-just-ferguson-
problem-how-traffic-courts-drive-inequality-in-california-4.20.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/GE2K-
UGJX]; see Assemb. Comm. 103, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
182. Brandon L. Garrett & William Crozier, Driver’s License Suspension in North Carolina
3 (Mar. 19, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3355599 [https://perma.cc/F9CC-Q2QS].
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and me, finds that, as of 2017, there are about 8,250,000 adult
drivers in North Carolina, and 1,225,000 active driver’s license
suspensions in North Carolina with 827,000 for failure to appear,
263,000 for failure to comply, and 135,000 for both.183 “This con-
stitutes about 15% of all adult drivers in the state.... These are just
those with active suspensions, and not those that have been
suspended in the past and had their licenses restored.”184 The
authors of this study analyzed individual and county characteristics
of these cases to better understand the patterns in suspension of
drivers’ licenses in North Carolina, and found both geographic and
racial disparities in such suspensions.185
A driver’s license is a protected property interest that, if issued
by the state, cannot be revoked or suspended “without that proce-
dural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”186 Yet
only four states require by statute that there be any inquiry into
ability to pay or indigency prior to suspension of drivers’ licenses.187
Indeed, many states make indefinite suspension mandatory upon
nonpayment of court debt.188 An inadequate process combined with
effects felt more severely by indigent drivers, where the suspensions
arise from failure (and inability) to pay fines and fees, are factors
that raise a classic equal process claim.189 Equal process claims have
been raised in litigation being brought in an increasing number of
jurisdictions challenging such driver’s license suspensions. Liti-
gation challenging driver’s license suspension for failure to pay
fines and fees has been recently brought, or is pending, in a range
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 9-13.
186. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1972).
187. Salas & Ciolfi, supra note 179, at 2.
188. Id. (“[Nineteen] states—almost 40% of the nation—have laws imposing mandatory
suspension upon nonpayment of court debt.”).
189. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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of states, including California,190 North Carolina,191 Michigan,192
Mississippi,193 Montana,194 Oregon,195 Tennessee,196 Virginia,197 and
190. See Landmark Lawsuit Settled, Paves Way for Fair Treatment of Low-Income Cal-
ifornia Drivers, ACLU N. CAL. (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.aclunc.org/news/landmark-lawsuit-
settled-paves-way-fair-treatment-low-income-california-drivers [https://perma.cc/ EZ84-JN6L].
191. Johnson v. Jessup, 381 F. Supp. 3d 619 (M.D.N.C. 2019) (dismissing due process claim
on the pleadings and rejecting application for preliminary injunction). See generally Class
Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Johnson, 381 F. Supp. 3d 619 (No.
1:18-cv-00467). The complaint alleges procedural due process violations, regarding lack of pre-
deprivation hearings and inadequate notice; for example, “Neither the North Carolina
General Code, including Sections 20-24.1 and 20-24.2, nor the DMV mandates a deprivation
hearing before indefinitely revoking a license for non-payment of fines and costs.” Id. at 29.
The Complaint also alleges an “Equal Protection and Due Process Bearden Violation.” Id. at
27. “The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits punishing individuals for
non-payment without first determining that they had the ability to pay and willfully refused
to make a monetary payment.” Id. (citation omitted).
192. See Fowler v. Johnson, No. 17-11441, 2017 WL 6540926, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 21,
2017) (sustaining preliminary injunction), rev’g 924 F.3d 247 (6th Cir. 2019).
193. See SPLC Reaches Agreement with Mississippi to Reinstate Over 100,000 Driver’s
Licenses Suspended for Non-Payment of Fines, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Dec. 19, 2017), https://
www.splcenter.org/news/2017/12/19/splc-reaches-agreement-mississippi [https://perma.cc/
XB39-FEJS].
194. See Class Action Complaint at 4-5, DiFrancesco v. Bullock, No. 2:17-cv-00066-SEH,
2019 WL 145627 (D. Mont. Aug. 31, 2017); Angela Brandt, Lawsuit Alleges Montana Dis-
criminates Against Drivers Too Poor to Pay Fines, INDEP. REC. (Sept. 6, 2017), https://helenair.
com/news/crime-and-courts/lawsuit-alleges-montana-discriminates-against-drivers-too-poor-
to-pay/article_a5c72474-b911-562c-84c5-78b7ce4ec9e8.html [https://perma.cc/BD9C-UMUR].
Legislation was enacted in Montana ending the practice in May 2019. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-
18-201(6) (2019).
195. See Mendoza v. Garrett, 358 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1150-51 (D. Or. 2018).
196. See Thomas v. Haslam, 329 F. Supp. 3d 475, 480, 484 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) (following
class certification, finding that driver’s license revocation violated due process and equal
protection rights).
197. See Class Action Complaint at 1-2, Stinnie v. Holcomb, 355 F. Supp. 3d 514 (No.
3:16CV00044). In the Virginia litigation, the Department of Justice filed a statement of
interest. See generally Statement of Interest of the United States, Stinnie, 355 F. Supp. 3d 514
(No. 3:16cv00044). The DOJ filing heavily relied upon Bearden, and it characterized the claim
as not just a procedural due process claim, but rather the statement began by explaining:
[S]uspending the driver’s licenses of those who fail to pay fines or fees without
inquiring into whether that failure to pay was willful or instead the result of an
inability to pay may result in penalizing indigent individuals solely because of
their poverty, in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 1-2. As of July, 2019, the practice has been ended and rights retroactively restored, in
a budget amendment effective for two years in Virginia. Pete DeLuca, Va. Passes Amendment
to Restore Thousands of Suspended Driver’s Licenses, NBC29 (Apr. 3, 2019, 1:05 PM),
https://nbc29.com/story/40248983/va-passes-amendment-to-restore-thousands-of-suspended-
drivers-licenses [https://perma.cc/9X3C-TMLF].
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Washington.198 The Sections that follow describe the reasoning in
several of the cases in which there have been judicial rulings.
1. Due Process Reasoning and Driver’s License Suspensions
In one such constitutional ruling, a federal district court in
Virginia issued a preliminary injunction halting the automatic
suspension of drivers’ licenses in Virginia for failure to pay state
court fines and costs,199 affecting over 900,000 people with such
suspensions.200 The federal judge emphasized that procedural due
process requires fair notice and an opportunity to be heard, applying
the three-step Mathews analysis to examine the automatic suspen-
sion scheme.201 The judge emphasized that the notice was not clear,
and more important, there was no procedure for a hearing on the
fact of the license suspension (with no waiver of the $145 DMV
reinstatement fee for inability to pay).202 The judge emphasized that
“the [l]oss of a driver's license adversely affects people’s ability to
gain and maintain employment, often leading to a reduction of
income,” and in turn, this “deprives individuals of means to pay
their court debt, hindering the fiscal interests of the government.”203 
This reasoning was exclusively a procedural due process analysis,
and it did not focus on the unequal burden placed on indigent
individuals and the discriminatory impact of doing so.204 In the case
of the Virginia statute, the failure to engage with equality concerns
may not matter practically. The same day as the ruling, the
Governor announced plans to end enforcement of the statute
through legislation; the new statute restoring rights and ending the
practice of suspending licenses for nonpayment of traffic fines and
fees was enacted and took effect in July 2019.205 The plaintiffs had
198. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1-6, Fuentes v. Benton County,
No. 15-2-02976-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.aclu-wa.org/docs/complaint-9
[https://perma.cc/V3UL-9GJJ].
199. Stinnie, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 519-20.
200. Class Action Complaint, supra note 197, at 5.
201. Stinnie, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 528.
202. Id. at 529, 530-31.
203. Id. at 521, 531.
204. Id. at 519-20.
205. Justin Wm. Moyer, Virginia Plans to End Driver’s License Suspensions for Court Debt,
Governor Says, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2018, 5:28 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
virginia-plans-to-end-drivers-license-suspensions-for-court-debt-governor-says/2018/12/20/
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raised equal protection claims, and those claims were simply not
discussed in the preliminary injunction ruling.206 In a North Car-
olina district court ruling, only the due process claim was the
subject of a motion to dismiss, and the judge dismissed it, reasoning
that there is no “fundamental right” to a driver’s license and finding
that sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard were provided
under the state statute, post-termination of the privilege.207
2. Equal Process Reasoning and Driver’s License Suspensions
In contrast to the ruling in the Virginia litigation, equal process
reasoning was adopted by the federal district court that certified
a class action challenging the practice in Tennessee.208 The plain-
tiffs had argued that their claim required only a “straightforward
application” of the equal process line of cases, from Griffin v. Illinois
through Bearden.209 The defendants argued that only rational basis
scrutiny applied to claims challenging class, under San Antonio v.
Rodriguez.210 The district court agreed that if the court treated the
case as a purely equal protection matter, the claims might fail, but
then went on to explain that based on another line of Supreme
Court rulings, such as Bearden, “the Supreme Court has said, in no
uncertain terms, that a different set of tools is called for.”211 Thus,
“[i]n Bearden and elsewhere, the Supreme Court has recognized
that, in select areas, ‘more is involved ... than the abstract question
whether [the challenged law] discriminates against a suspect class,
or whether [the matter at issue] is a fundamental right.’”212 The
district court stated that “the ability to drive is crucial to the
0e8ee990-03b4-11e9-b990-da60de24fefb_story.html [https://perma.cc/8SJ5-CGLX].
206. See Stinnie, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 527; Gabby Birenbaum, Northam Touts Opportunity
to Get Suspended Driver’s License Restored, RICHMOND-TIMES-DISPATCH (July 2, 2019), https://
www.richmond.com/news/virginia/government-politics/northam-touts-opportunity-to-get-sus
pended-driver-s-licenses-restored/article_a228d5f3-d58f-5036-ae39-3db9bc08dad1.html
[https://perma.cc/KT4S-BCHG].
207. Johnson v. Jessup, 381 F. Supp. 3d 619, 631 (M.D.N.C. 2019).
208. See Thomas v. Haslam, 303 F. Supp. 3d 585 (M.D. Tenn. 2018); see also Robinson v.
Purkey, 326 F.R.D. 105, 146, 170-71 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) (certifying class action challenging
driver’s license revocation in City of Nashville).
209. Thomas, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 607.
210. Id. at 610.
211. Id. at 612.
212. Id. (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982)).
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debtor’s ability to actually establish the economic self-sufficiency
that is necessary to be able to pay the relevant debt.”213 
The federal district court judge concluded that the Tennessee
practice violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses;
an appeal is pending.214 The judge called the practice “powerfully
counterproductive.”215 The judge explained: “If a person has no re-
sources to pay a debt, he cannot be threatened or cajoled into paying
it; he may, however, become able to pay it in the future. But taking
his driver's license away sabotages that prospect.”216 The judge
elaborated on the consequences of a suspension:
For one thing, the lack of a driver's license substantially limits
one's ability to obtain and maintain employment. Even aside
from the effect on employment, however, the inability to drive
introduces new obstacles, risks, and costs to a wide array of life
activities, as the former driver is forced into a daily ordeal of
logistical triage to compensate for his inadequate transportation.
In short, losing one’s driver's license simultaneously makes the
burdens of life more expensive and renders the prospect of
amassing the resources needed to overcome those burdens more
remote.217
The district judge noted that where many continue to drive, they
may face further prosecution and further fines for driving with a
suspended license.218 Thus, court debt “leads to a license revocation;
the revocation leads to another conviction, this time for driving on
a revoked license; the new conviction creates more debt; and the
cycle begins again, with the driver, who was already indigent, only
deeper in the red to ... a debt spiral.”219 This ruling did constitute a
proper Bearden analysis and a reliance on an equal process theory,
as developed here. Both equality and procedural due process sup-
ported the judicial ruling.
213. Id. at 615.
214. Thomas v. Haslam, 329 F. Supp. 3d 475, 480, 491, 494, 496-97 (M.D. Tenn. 2018)
(following class certification, finding that driver’s license revocation violated due process and
equal protection rights).
215. Id. at 483.
216. Id. at 483-84.
217. Id. at 484.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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Compare, however, a ruling in the District of Oregon, similarly
challenging a state scheme suspending drivers’ licenses for failure
to pay traffic fines.220 The federal judge denied relief, after citing
extensively to the language in Bearden describing a cumulative
equal protection and due process claim.221 Yet after doing so, the
judge proceeded to separately analyze equal protection and due
process theories.222 The judge concluded that no heightened scrutiny
applied if it was treated as an equal protection theory (and that the
access-to-justice cases turned on the presence of a connection to
criminal imprisonment or a fundamental right to child custody).223
The judge then conducted a procedural due process analysis, and
again found the test not satisfied, with shell-game type reasoning
noting that since there was no fundamental right implicated, an
absence of a fair process to determine ability to pay was not
needed.224 
The judge appeared genuinely confused about why other courts
seemed to have “applied a more stringent level of scrutiny,” when
they did not purport to do so.225 What the judge did not appreciate
was that, without heightened scrutiny, the cumulative effect of a
due process and equal protection violation can make the constitu-
tional violation more serious. That is why the Court granted relief
in Bearden226 and that is why other district judges have done so
regarding driver’s license suspensions that implicate wealth and
unfair process.227
3. Fines and Fees Litigation
Court debt can result in a range of other consequences, and
litigation has challenged other fines and fee-related practices. Fines
and fees-related litigation has targeted courts that impose other
consequences without considering ability to pay.228 Based on the
220. Mendoza v. Garrett, 358 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1150 (D. Or. 2018).
221. Id. at 1171-72, 1182.
222. Id. at 1176, 1178.
223. Id. at 1169-71.
224. Id. at 1179.
225. Id. at 1172.
226. Id. at 1167.
227. See supra notes 212-19 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Kennedy v. City of Biloxi, No. 1:15-cv-348-HSO-
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analysis discussed here, many of these challenged schemes seem
obviously violative of Bearden and the equal process case law de-
scribed. As a result, the lawsuits have been highly successful.
Perhaps what is most remarkable is how persistent such fines and
fees practices have been in local jurisdictions, despite their appar-
ent constitutional flaws.
Two lawsuits in New Orleans have resulted in decrees that state
judges violated constitutional rights of litigants by imposing
criminal fines without considering ability to pay, as well as creat-
ing a conflict of interest in which the same judges imposing those
fines and fees were largely funded through their imposition.229
Lawsuits successfully challenged municipal fine practices in St.
Louis, Missouri.230 ACLU lawsuits in the state of Washington led to
a settlement in a county with particularly aggressive fines and fees
practices, as well as encouraging state legislation to provide
indigent persons relief from interest payments.231 A Southern
Center for Human Rights lawsuit in Columbus, Georgia, challeng-
ing “victim fees” imposed on domestic violence survivors, settled
with the City agreeing to end the practice and restitution to be paid
JCG, 2016 WL 4425862 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 21, 2015); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, Fuentes v. Benton County, No. 15-2-02976-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2015), https://
www.aclu-wa.org/docs/complaint-9 [https://perma.cc/V3UL-9GJJ]; First Amendment Class
Action Complaint at 2-3, Cain v. City of New Orleans, No. 2:15-cv-04479-SSV-JCW, 2015 WL
5460413 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 2015); Complaint Class Action, Foster v. City of Alexander City,
3:15-cv-647-WKW, 2015 WL 5256630 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 8, 2015); Complaint Class Action,
Edwards v. Red Hills Cmty. Prob., LLC, No. 1:15-cv-67 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 10, 2015), https:// www.
clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/CJ-GA-0010-0002.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4KP-M7GT]; Set-
tlement Agreement and Release of Claims at 1-2, Thompson v. DeKalb County, No. 1:15-cv-
00280-TWT, 2015 WL 6087502 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2015); Preliminary Injunction Order at 1-2,
Mitchell v. City of Montgomery, No. 2:14-cv-186-MEF, 2014 WL 11099432 (M.D. Ala. May 1,
2014).
229. Matt Sledge, New Orleans Judges to Appeal Decisions in Fines and Fees Lawsuits,
NEW ORLEANS ADVOC. (Aug. 21, 2018, 12:59 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/new_orleans/
news/courts/article_fbd197d6-a56b-11e8-befe-abaf6281ca54.html [https://perma.cc/N53N-
UKGX].
230. See Settlement Agreement at 1-2, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, No. 4:15-CV-00252-CEJ
(E.D. Mo. Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/CJ-MO-0006-0005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GH7F-2QK5]; Susan Weich, Municipal Court Judges in St. Louis County Are
Told to Open Doors, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (July 1, 2014), https://www.stltoday.com/news/
local/crime-and-courts/municipal-court-judges-in-st-louis-county-are-told-to/article_e965d081-
758d-500a-abb7-a054916edad2.html [https://perma.cc/HC55-ZLY4].
231. Monica Llorente, Criminalizing Poverty Through Fines, Fees, and Costs, ABA (Oct. 2,
2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/childrens-rights/articles/20
16/criminalizing-poverty-fines-fees-costs.html [https://perma.cc/TT9Y-XAK8].
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to those charged the fees.232 Another lawsuit is challenging extra
fees charged by a private company that profits from “pay-only” pro-
bation services in Georgia.233 Other cases have successfully chal-
lenged criminal justice debt collection practices.234 
Yet another set of lawsuits has challenged diversion programs
that provide alternatives to incarceration, but only to defendants
that pay the fees, and without basing fees on ability to pay. A case
in Charlotte, North Carolina, challenged such a deferred pros-
ecution program on behalf of a man who owed the victim $1899
in restitution, but could only pay $100 given his resources; the
district attorney ended the practice of requiring payment of such
amounts.235 A series of state courts have struck down fee-based
diversion programs.236
232. Columbus Court Abolishes “Victim Fee,” Pays Restitution to Survivors of Crime, S. CTR.
FOR HUM. RTS. (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.schr.org/resources/columbus_court_abolishes_vic
tim_fee_pays_restitution_to_survivors_of_crime [https://perma.cc/C6CA-FFVU].
233. Sentinel Offender Services Sued for Collecting Illegal Fees in Atlanta Municipal Court,
S. CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. (July 26, 2017), https://www.schr.org/resources/sentinel_offender_ser
vices_sued_for_collecting_illegal_fees_in_atlanta_municipal_court [https://perma.cc/GU5C-
5CHZ].
234. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 758, 779-80 (M.D.
Tenn. 2016).
235. Michael Gordon, DA Drops ‘Pay to Play’ Requirement for Program that Helps Defen-
dants Avoid Trial, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Feb. 16, 2018), https://charlotteobserver.com/news/
local/crime/article200492979.html [https://perma.cc/MA85-MR4X] (“In a change that could
affect dozens of criminal cases each year, District Attorney Spencer Merriweather announced
that his office’s ‘deferred prosecution’ program will no longer require nonviolent, first-time
defendants to pay down court-assigned restitution to $1,000 or less.”); Michael Gordon, Yes,
Rich People Have a Better Chance of Getting Off in Court, Public Defender Says, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (Sept. 21, 2017, 11:56 AM), https://charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-govern
ment/article174707216.html [https://perma.cc/B49B-5X7E].
236. See, e.g., Mueller v. State, 837 N.E.2d 198, 205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“A practice of
requiring payment of a fee as an absolute condition of participation in a pretrial diversion
program discriminates against indigent persons in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”);
Moody v. State, 716 So. 2d 562, 565 (Miss. 1998) (en banc) (finding unconstitutional fee-based
diversion program, because “an indigent’s equal protection rights are violated when all po-
tential defendants are offered one way to avoid prosecution and that one way is to pay a fine,
and there is no determination as to an individual’s ability to pay such a fine”); Commonwealth
v. Melnyk, 548 A.2d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (finding that conditioning diversion on
paying restitution would “deprive the petitioner her interest in repaying her debt to society
without receiving a criminal record simply because, through no fault of her own, she could not
pay restitution”).
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4. Fines, Fees, and Voting Rights
In thirty states, former felons who have not paid fines and fees
have voting rights restricted.237 These provisions have not been
successfully challenged, but they should raise even greater consti-
tutional concerns than driver’s license suspension. Consider a case
in which an equal process approach was not adopted. In its ruling
in Johnson v. Bredesen, the Sixth Circuit rejected a challenge to a
state law that required former felons to pay any outstanding child
support before having their right to vote restored.238 That court
interpreted Bearden as applying heightened scrutiny because the
right of physical liberty was involved, but deemed no such height-
ened scrutiny relevant where the right to vote was concerned.239
Such an interpretation completely misunderstands the equal pro-
cess line of cases, and Bearden itself, which was not a case that
claimed to apply any heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Instead, it was both the concern with procedural due
process and the unequal burdens of that process that resulted in a
joint-constitutional violation.240 Moreover, adding to those concerns,
a loss of voting rights seems to further reinforce exactly what the
Court was concerned with in its equal process cases. 
Beth Colgan has recently written a detailed analysis of state
statutes that disenfranchise former felons for failure to pay costs,
fines, and fees.241 Colgan notes that many courts have treated the
question as a voting rights problem and have not properly under-
stood the relevant claim as implicating the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses.242 In so doing, courts are failing to examine
the Bearden and access-to-justice lines of cases: they have failed, as
I have put it, to consider an intersectional equal process theory.243
That is, courts must examine whether there are alternative means
237. Karin Martin & Anne Stuhldreher, These People Have Been Barred from Voting Today
Because They're in Debt, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/post
everything/wp/2016/11/08/they-served-their-time-but-many-ex-offenders-cant-vote-if-they-
still-owe-fines/ [https://perma.cc/3CG2-5JFX].
238. 624 F.3d 742, 750 (6th Cir. 2010).
239. Id. at 748-49.
240. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665-66, 672-73 (1983).
241. Beth A. Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement, 72 VAND. L. REV. 55 (2019).
242. Id. at 61-62.
243. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 28, at 1331.
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for the government to accomplish its interest in repayment based
on the person’s ability to pay and without engaging in voter dis-
enfranchisement. As Colgan points out, courts can still use the civil
and criminal systems to collect debts: they can engage in debt col-
lection to more directly obtain payment, rather than punish by
removing an unrelated ability to vote.244 Moreover, in an ostensibly
debt-collection-related practice, States must include fair process for
actually determining financial ability to pay. Blanket disenfran-
chisement for failure to pay court costs and fees imposed on indigent
people should be considered a grave constitutional violation, im-
plicating voting rights and equal process.
C. DOJ Pattern and Practice Litigation
Most states currently permit imprisonment for willful failure to
pay fines, fees, and costs and impose other collateral consequences
for failing to satisfy those debts, including extension of probation,
denial of voting rights, restriction on expunction, and suspension of
other privileges, such as drivers’ licenses.245 States even commonly
charge indigent defense fees to defendants who are, by definition,
indigent and therefore receive appointed counsel in criminal
cases.246 In reaction to criticism, advocacy, and litigation, many
states are now reconsidering barriers to justice that may effectively
create debtor-prisons by punishing indigent people who cannot pay
for failure to pay fines and fees.247 The Civil Rights Division of the
Department of Justice has used its authority under the Violent
Crime Control Enforcement Act of 1994248 to obtain injunctive relief
244. Colgan, supra note 241, at 62-63.
245. See ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR
THE POOR 50 (2016); ALICIA BANNON ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 2, 25, 29 (2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJV9-9ZQX].
246. Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 19,
2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the-
poor [https://perma.cc/97VQ-QR5T].
247. Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt & Modern-Day Debtors’
Prisons, 75 MD. L. REV. 486, 507 (2016); Arthur W. Pepin, The End of Debtors’ Prisons:
Effective Court Policies for Successful Compliance with Legal Financial Obligations, CONF. ST.
CT. ADMINS. 1 (2016), https://cosca-ncsc.org/?/media/Microsites/Files/COSCA/Policy%20Papers
/End-of-Debtors-Prisons-2016.ashx [https://perma.cc/CP8R-8WUN].
248. 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b) (2012).
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in cases involving discriminatory use of fines and fees, most prom-
inently in Ferguson, Missouri.249
The Consent Decree reached in the Ferguson case is a model for
designing careful remedies that take account of both process and
equality values. I have described how the Harris County remedy
adopted by the Fifth Circuit focused unduly narrowly just on asking
judges to make individualized rulings (and without any requirement
that they offer reasons for the decisions).250 In contrast, the Fer-
guson Consent Decree contained broad systematic relief requiring
data collection and monitoring of police conduct, civilian oversight,
changes to municipal code enforcement, use of force training for
police, and training on bias-free and community policing among the
many remedial provisions in the agreement.251 The patterns of
alleged constitutional violations ranged from First Amendment
violations, to race discrimination claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment, to equal protection and due process claims concerning
abuse levying fines and fees.252 A cumulative remedy was designed
to address multiple and systematic constitutional violations.
249. Consent Decree at 83-84, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-000180-CPP
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/art/file/833701/download [https://perma.cc/
VN4Z-PYML]. For the investigative report by the Department of Justice, see CIVIL RIGHTS
DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 3 (2015),
https://justice.gov/sites/default/files/apa/press-release/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_
police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4XA-BD9L]; see also Neil L. Sobol, Lessons
Learned from Ferguson: Ending Abusive Collection of Criminal Justice Debt, 15 U. MD. L.J.
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 293, 309 (2015).
250. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
251. Consent Decree, supra note 249, at 9, 11, 73, 99, 119.
252. Complaint at 20, 23, 32, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-00180 (E.D.
Mo. Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/832451/download [https://perma.cc/S9WM-
QXSE]. The equal process claim is described in the introduction to the complaint as a practice
by city officials to “prosecute and resolve municipal charges in a manner that violates due
process and equal protection guarantees,” alongside Fourth Amendment excessive force vio-
lations, race discrimination claims, and First Amendment violations. Id. at 1-2. Paragraph
81 details the equal process claim:
Defendant, through its agents, has established and continues to implement
practices and procedures that result in deprivations of due process and equal
protection. These practices and procedures impede an individual’s ability to
challenge or resolve a municipal charge, and result in additional penalties,
including incarceration, that are imposed to compel the payment of court
debts—even though the court does not deem any municipal violation to itself
justify a penalty of incarceration.
Id. at 23-24.
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III. TOWARDS A NEW EQUAL PROCESS
Equal process claims and remedies should take a central place in
not just litigation, but also our theory of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In the Parts that follow, I describe the Supreme Court’s fail-
ure to apply an equal process theory in (1) Obergefell and same-sex
marriage rulings; (2) Trump v. Hawaii and executive power con-
cerning immigration; and (3) abortion rights rulings. Next, I de-
scribe the potential for equal process claims in (1) challenging new
forms of status, (2) rethinking process theory, and (3) reinvigorating
litigation and remedies surrounding access to justice more broadly.
A. Supreme Court Failures to Apply Equal Process
There is nothing unusual about cumulative constitutional rights
analysis; “any number of the most commonly litigated constitution-
al theories involve cumulative theories, particularly intersectional
rights.”253 The connection between equality and procedural due
process, however, has particular potential to address class-based
discrimination concerns. When the government uses wealth cat-
egories, it often provides unfair process as well. In Part II, I
described a wave of recent litigation raising equal process claims,
although often without clearly setting them out as such. Here, I
describe further missed opportunities in which the Supreme Court
failed to adequately articulate an equal process approach. One
missed opportunity already noted is the case of Kadrmas v. Dick-
inson Public Schools, in which the Court upheld a ninety-seven
dollar fee for bus service imposed on an indigent child; the Court
reasoned that no suspect class or fundamental right was involved.254
However, it could have instead found it arbitrary to not base im-
position of the fee on any determination of ability to pay. Below I
turn to other such missed opportunities in the prominent areas of
same-sex marriage rulings, immigration law, and abortion rights.
253. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 28, at 1354.
254. 487 U.S. 450, 453-54, 465 (1988).
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1. Same-Sex Marriage and Equal Process
The equal process line of cases surfaced in Obergefell v. Hodges,
in which Justice Kennedy cited to those cases as an example of the
importance of the connection between equal protection and due
process in setting out the constitutional right of same-sex couples to
marry.255 The opinion emphasized: “The right of same-sex couples to
marry that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is derived, too, from that Amendment's guarantee of the equal
protection of the laws.”256 The Court drew together due process and
equality concerns, noting: “In any particular case one Clause may
be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate
and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in
the identification and definition of the right.”257
In some respects, the use of the equal process cases was inappo-
site. Obergefell linked substantive due process with equality con-
cerns in a fundamental rights equal protection analysis. Thus, the
discussion in Obergefell turned from the citation to Bearden and
noting that the Court has sometimes connected due process and
equal protection theories, to cases such as Loving v. Virginia that
involved substantive due process claims regarding a fundamental
right to marry, as well as equal protection claims regarding race
discrimination in anti-miscegenation laws.258 
Obergefell did not discuss procedure. There was no discussion of
due process or concerns with government rules affecting individuals
based on characteristics such as wealth. Obergefell dealt with a rule
more like that in Loving: state regulations categorically excluding
couples from marriage.259 However, seen another way, Obergefell
could have discussed less categorical questions raised by discrimina-
tion against LGBTQ families and relationships. Perhaps Obergefell
should have done so, taking the citation to Bearden more seriously.
Indeed, Obergefell went on to cite Zablocki v. Redhail as another
example of the “synergy” between equal protection and due process,
noting how, in the case, there was both a due process concern and
255. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015). 
256. Id. at 2602.
257. Id. at 2603.
258. Id.
259. See id. at 2593.
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an equality concern where ability to marry was conditioned on fi-
nancial ability to pay back child support.260 Next, the Court cited
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., in which “the Court invalidated under due process
and equal protection principles a statute requiring indigent mothers
to pay a fee in order to appeal the termination of their parental
rights.”261
Relying on those cases, the Obergefell Court could have discussed
wealth inequality and the many contexts in which public benefits
or access can disadvantage LGBTQ individuals and relationships.
However, no wealth-based distinction was litigated. The states did
not charge a fee for access to marriage, but rather denied access to
the legal institution of marriage, which in turn brings with it public
benefits and cost savings associated with the institution.262 To be
sure, many have pointed out that had the ruling focused more on
equality, it would have had more implications for discrimination
against LGBTQ individuals generally, including outside of and in
addition to marriage.263 Moreover, had the focus, even within mar-
riage and family relationships, been on procedural due process, then
the case would have had clearer application for financial and other
burdens that states might place on LGBTQ relationships, outside of
the context of categorically barring marriage.264 Obergefell did not
clearly explain the connection between equality and due process
that was the center of its ruling. The Court did not set out the level
of scrutiny that applied, and, therefore, litigants do not know wheth-
er heightened scrutiny necessarily applies in other cases of govern-
ment action discriminating against LGBTQ individuals.265 In ad-
dition, there was more than one intersection at play: not just the
connection between a substantive due process fundamental right to
marriage and equality, but also the concern that when disfavored
groups are singled out in less categorical settings, their procedural
rights may be harmed as well. Kerry Abrams and I have discussed
260. Id. at 2603.
261. Id. at 2604 (citing M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 119-124 (1996)).
262. See id. at 2606.
263. See Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV.
147, 173 (2015).
264. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Implementing Marriage Equality in America, 65 DUKE L.J.
ONLINE 25, 37-39 (2015) (discussing state legislation that allows private individuals to
discriminate against LGBTQ individuals).
265. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 28, at 1314-15.
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how a clearer intersection analysis reasoning would have clarified
and enhanced the impact of Obergefell.266 However, the Court did
not frame the case in a way that suited the equal process claims set
out here: where there is a government classification that is wealth-
based, and it implicates fairness of government procedures or ac-
cess to fundamental rights. 
2. Lack of Process and Trump v. Hawaii
In the discussion of Trump v. Hawaii, much of the analysis has
focused on whether the Supreme Court correctly analyzed evidence
of discriminatory intent relevant to a claim of religious or ethnic
discrimination.267 That focus makes sense, since that was the claim
the majority opinion, as well as the dissents, discussed.268 However,
lower courts engaged with a different theory—a due process
theory—that was initially quite prominent in the litigation.269 
As in many cases, plaintiffs initially included a range of claims in
their civil rights complaints, although the issues were narrowed
over time and as higher courts limited their own review.270 Pro-
cedural due process was especially important early on in the
litigation, because the early executive orders applied to green card
holders.271 Arbitrary revocation of rights of legal permanent
residents to enter the country raised serious due process concerns,
and, in response to litigation, the Administration quickly amended
the Executive Order so that it would not apply to green card hold-
ers.272 However, that did not allay the concern that the Order
permitted arbitrary treatment that affected legal permanent res-
idents and citizens, particularly family members of those covered by
266. See id. at 1337.
267. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Trump v. Hawaii: How the Supreme Court
Simultaneously Overturned and Revived Korematsu, 128 YALE L.J. 641 (2019).
268. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418, 2421 (2018); id. at 2429 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); id. at 2433 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
269. Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 37-38, Hawaii v.
Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (D. Haw. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-00050-DKW-KSC), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
270. See Abrams & Garrett, supra note 28, at 1353 (“Aggregation of constitutional rights
is a pervasive feature of constitutional litigation. Litigants would not neglect to include an
additional or alternative constitutional theory in a complaint.”).
271. See Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017).
272. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2403-04, 2406.
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the Order.273 Indeed, the revisions to the Order permitted waivers
by consular officials,274 and there is evidence of poor process and
potentially arbitrary outcomes.275 The Supreme Court focused on the
fact of some inter-agency deliberation in drafting and redrafting the
Executive Orders,276 but it did not consider that thin process and
discretion of consular officials with few checks would disparately fall
on persons based on religion and ethnicity.277 An equal process claim
would have resulted in a very different analysis. However, neither
the majority nor the dissents considered such analysis, despite
equal protection and due process claims being raised in the lower
courts.278
3. Equal Process and Abortion Rights
In other prominent constitutional contexts, equality and process
concerns have not been adequately or jointly considered. As Cary
Franklin has detailed, beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court
has moved far away from considering class in the abortion rights
cases concerning government funding.279 In more recent cases, such
as Whole Women’s Health, the effect of abortion regulation and
whether it constitutes an “undue burden” is focused on how that
burden falls disparately on indigent women.280 However, the analy-
sis, as Franklin highlights, is not explicitly class-based.281 Wealth is
in the background; it should be in the foreground. 
One response based on the analysis here is that the claims could
be framed as raising questions of wealth-based access. Even if the
Supreme Court treats the relevant claims as substantive due pro-
cess claims, rather than procedural due process claims, M.L.B. v.
S.L.J. might still be applicable.282 It is a longstanding concern, of
course, that the Court has not treated abortion cases as equal
273. See id. at 2445 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 2422 (majority opinion).
275. See id. at 2445 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
276. See id. at 2408-12 (majority opinion).
277. See id. at 2430-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
278. See Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1147 n.8 (D. Haw. 2017).
279. Franklin, supra note 31, at 70-73.
280. Id. at 77-78.
281. Id. at 78-82.
282. See generally 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
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protection cases raising questions regarding disparate treatment of
women.283 However, the cases also do not examine procedure in the
way that they might, given how focused abortion regulations are in
restricting access to the indigent.284 Thus, abortion cases may not
only neglect equality by failing to analyze the regulations as dis-
parately affecting women, but they may also neglect procedural due
process by focusing on substantive due process and not on liberty
and fairness concerns. The Supreme Court’s abortion cases fail to
conduct two separate and distinct intersectional, cumulative con-
stitutional analyses.285 A case which raises a state-law standard
that does not take ability to pay into account would most clearly
implicate the equal process cases.286 However, the broader concern
with wealth inequality, as connected with important procedural and
substantive due process rights, seems well supported by case law,
including M.L.B., and could better inform doctrine.287
B. Challenging Status and Inequality
The connection between equality and due process is important
and helps to bring out concerns with status and subordination.
Status relationships may not be legal, but they may be social.
Further, even as to legal status, as Reva Siegal puts it, “[t]he ways
in which the legal system enforces social stratification are various
and evolve over time.”288 Equal process claims combine a focus on
subordination with the use of arbitrary procedure to create new
forms of status or subordination.289 The tiers of scrutiny are not
consistently employed by courts in practice, and the Supreme Court
has been very reluctant to recognize any new groups entitled to
heightened scrutiny. In contrast, new government practices that
283. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 383 (1985); Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Equality
Arguments for Abortion Rights, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 160, 163 (2013).
284. See Franklin, supra note 31, at 10-11.
285. See Abrams & Garrett, supra note 28, at 1353-55 (arguing that courts should conduct
intersection analyses of equal protection and substantive due process rights).
286. See id. at 1332-33.
287. See id.
288. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997).
289. See id. at 1113-14.
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disadvantage groups, including those not subject to strict scrutiny
but that also follow unfair process, can receive review under equal
process claims. Social stratification can reflect unfair and arbitrary
process, and not just through the singling out of groups or ani-
mus.290 As a result, equal process claims may better address sys-
temic consequences of government action. That said, equal process
claims cannot address social stratification that is not connected to
state action or where state action does not hinge on ability to pay.
Disparate impact theories have not been developed in the courts
under an equal process theory. Much remains to be done to develop
whether non-indigency, but rather other types of poor procedure
that produce disparate outcomes, might similarly deserve equal
process review.
1. Equal Process and Process Theory
How can we bring the Equal Protection Clause to bear on
pressing questions of discrimination? One solution was John Hart
Ely’s process theory, used to help explain tiers of scrutiny (and
develop them) under the Equal Protection Clause.291 The focus
there, following the Carolene Products “Footnote 4” language,292 is
to more strictly scrutinize government action disparately affecting
groups persistently left out of the political process.293 Political
rights, such as voting rights, might be of special concern under such
a theory, but so might other government action that systematically
disadvantages a group. In some recent decisions, Supreme Court
Justices have expressed skepticism about process theory’s relevance
or applicability, as have commentators such as Dan Ortiz, who have
argued that controversial substantive judgments are unavoidable
in constitutional interpretation.294
290. See id.
291. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
292. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
293. ELY, supra note 291, at 73-77.
294. See Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process
Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 721, 721-22 (1991) (“[T]he central inquiry of process theory, whether
the political decision-making process has functioned properly, is substantive through and
through.”); see also Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory,
77 VA. L. REV. 747, 747-48 (1991) (contending that “the impossibility of devising a
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However, equal process theory merely reflects the intersection of
two powerful clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In so doing,
equal process claims add something to that process theory approach.
Here, I argue, relying on an intersectional theory of cumulative
constitutional harm developed with Kerry Abrams, that separate
concerns with procedural arbitrariness can heighten the concern
about discrimination. Process can be seen as itself a separate com-
ponent of the constitutional theory: it is both a procedural and
substantive claim.295 Groups left out of the political process may face
arbitrary treatment, which is of distinct concern and adds weight to
their claims,296 even if they are not recognized as a suspect class
(such as with class itself or indigency).297 It distorts the democratic
process to weigh down indigent people with costs that they cannot
pay by means of a process that they cannot meaningfully use to
challenge these unequal burdens. The Supreme Court, in cases such
as Bearden, gets right a fundamental fact of democratic legitimacy:
participation requires both attention to equality and fair process.298
2. Access to Justice
The access-to-courts and access-to-justice theories have never sat
comfortably in constitutional law scholarship. One reason may be
that they combine criminal procedure and civil rights. Criminal
procedure claims are studied by different scholars and with different
perspectives. Access-to-courts claims, since they have arisen in ar-
eas relating to appellate filing, rights of jailhouse lawyers, parole
and probation, and court costs, are often not covered in traditional
constitutional law casebooks, which instead often focus on cases
such as Rodriguez299 and the question of whether wealth classifi-
cations receive strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.300
nonsubstantive condemnation of race discrimination (as Ely sought to do) is not a fatal flaw
in political process theory”).
295. See Klarman, supra note 294, at 747-48.
296. See ELY, supra note 291, at 73-77.
297. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (“[T]his Court has held repeatedly
that poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification.”).
298. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 664-67 (1983) (“Due process and equal
protection principles converge in the Court’s analysis in these cases.”).
299. See generally San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
300. See, e.g., Lloyd C. Anderson, The Constitutional Right of Poor People to Appeal Without
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One goal here is to highlight the importance of these cases to
mainstream constitutional theory. For better or for worse, one
reason why is that criminal justice consequences affect so many
people in society—that housing rights, voting rights, employment
rights, and so many other rights, all connect with fines, fees, and
criminal justice outcomes.
To complicate matters further, the equal process connection is
not, by any means, the only useful theory available to challenge
obstacles to justice or government programs that increase inequal-
ity. Other constitutional rights may be relevant and may strengthen
claims challenging lack of access to justice or unequal burdens
imposed by government. For example, in the fines and fees area, the
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause could be a robust
source of protection.301 It has been interpreted narrowly by the
Supreme Court in the past, but that could change.302 The narrow
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence may explain why it has been the
due process and equal protection clauses that have done so much
work in the past.
It is highly problematic that the equal process cases do not suf-
ficiently take account of race discrimination, particularly given the
remedial purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Olatunde
Johnson has noted, rising concern with economic justice has often
neglected racial inequality that accompanies and can drive economic
inequality.303 Supreme Court rulings such as Rodriguez that failed
to remedy schemes that disparately impacted the poor similarly
failed to discuss the disparate racial impact of such measures.304
Payment of Fees: Convergence of Due Process and Equal Protection in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 32 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 441, 485-87 (1999); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and
Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights—Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1164-
65; Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene's Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of
Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2117-19 (2009).
301. See U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
302. See Tamar R. Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH.& LEE L. REV. 1595, 1636-37
(2015); Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 283-84
(2014); Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Paying for Your Time: How Charging Inmates Fees Behind Bars
May Violate the Excessive Fines Clause, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 319, 320-23 (2014); see also
People v. Malone, 923 P.2d 163, 163-65 (Colo. App. 1995) (vacating $100,000 fine levied
against convinced criminal defendant). 
303. Johnson, supra note 37, at 1665 (“Highlighting race, ethnic, and gender difference,
then, is a necessary disruption of the current interest in economic inequality.”).
304. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29 (noting that the Supreme Court “has never heretofore
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Equal Process cases that have provided relief, however, have
similarly neglected discussion of race. 
Many of the fines, fees, and pretrial policies being challenged in
current litigation have a dramatically racially disparate impact, in
addition to their impact on the poor. The American Bar Association
has highlighted how “[f]ines and fees that are not income-adjusted
... are regressive and have a disproportionate, adverse impact on
low-income people and people of color.”305 The Department of Jus-
tice, post-Ferguson,306 has reminded municipalities that racial dis-
parities in fines and fees practices are unlawful.307 Those racial
disparities have often been neglected in judicial rulings, although
they certainly have been raised by litigants. It is a troubling feature
of our constitutional jurisprudence that courts can be more com-
fortable focusing on procedure and on disparate impact on the poor
than on race disparities. It certainly is telling that a race disparity
claim under Washington v. Davis308 may be much harder to prove
than an equal process claim under Bearden v. Georgia.309 This is all
the more troubling given the long history of abuse of fines and fees
used to oppress and discriminate against blacks and minorities,
including in the Jim Crow South.310
Equal process claims may play a greater role if new social benefits
are adopted, such as through living-wage legislation, or college-
held that wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict
scrutiny”).
305. ABA, TEN GUIDELINES ON COURT FINES AND FEES 5 (Aug. 2018), https://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2018-AM-Resolutions/114.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JDQ2-BN7F]. Regarding racial disparities in driver’s license suspensions, see Garrett &
Crozier, supra note 182; and BACK ON THE RD. CAL., STOPPED, FINED, ARRESTED: RACIAL BIAS
IN POLICING AND TRAFFIC COURTS IN CALIFORNIA 1, 22-24 (2016), http://ebclc.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/04/Stopped_Fined_Arrested_BOTRCA.pdf [https://perma.cc/FBB5-Q45J].
306. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 249.
307. Letter from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. of the Civil
Rights Div., & Lisa Foster, Dir. of the Office of Access to Justice to Colleague, supra note 180
(emphasizing that practices related to the imposition of fines may “violate Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, when they unnecessarily impose disparate harm on the
basis of race or national origin”).
308. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
309. 421 U.S. 660 (1983); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 125-27 (rejecting res-
pondents’ argument that Washington v. Davis overruled “the Griffin line of cases,” and noting
that Bearden v. Georgia, adhered “to Griffin’s principle of ‘equal justice’”).
310. See DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF
BLACK PEOPLE IN AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 53-57, 63-67 (2008); ERIC
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 198-205 (1988).
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tuition assistance programs. Such benefits should be made avail-
able equitably. If such benefits are denied or terminated unfairly or
in a disparate manner, equal process claims will be an important
way to challenge such treatment. In contrast, equal protection
claims do not define the affirmative rights to minimal resources
necessary for meaningful participation in society. They do not as
readily support a living wage, public housing, or other mixed public
and private goods. Such claims better support access to justice
where the state has a monopoly on the good and conditions it in
ways implicating wealth. A broader theory of the Equal Protection
Clause, which many have advocated,311 would be needed to support
a race- and class-based equal citizenship approach to the Fourteenth
Amendment.
CONCLUSION
“Equal process” claims arise from a line of Supreme Court and
lower court cases in which wealth inequality is the central concern
and in which “[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge
in the Court’s analysis.”312 These lines of cases are very much alive,
but they have often been neglected, including because courts, and
the Supreme Court itself, are sometimes reluctant to engage in
cumulative constitutional analysis.313 However, these cases ex-
emplify why sometimes joint harms really are more problematic and
deserve more careful scrutiny. The equal process connection is at
the forefront of litigation concerning the constitutionality of fines,
311. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive
Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 959-98 (1983); Thomas C. Grey, Property
and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 877, 888-
901 (1976); William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L.
REV. 1, 1-2, 7-9, 37 (1985); see also Sundeep Kothari, And Justice for All: The Role Equal
Protection and Due Process Principles Have Played in Providing Indigents with Meaningful
Access to the Courts, 72 TUL. L. REV. 2159, 2201 (1998) (“The framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended that due process and equal protection be intertwined, because they
understood that substance, procedure, and equality were related steps in determining what
is just and fair.”).
312. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983); see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying
text.
313. See supra Part III.A.
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fees, cash bail, and, perhaps soon, challenges to voting restric-
tions.314
The connection between equality and procedure will be all the
more important if both the reliance on fines and fees, and, con-
versely, the provision of social benefits, are reconsidered and ex-
panded. Far too often it is the poor who are disproportionately fined
and deprived of the means to a livelihood.315 That is exactly the type
of government action that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
can remedy. Equal process claims are likely to multiply as groups
continue to litigate access-to-justice-related claims and claims
related to the use of costs and fees to disparately burden those with
inability to pay. A robust Fourteenth Amendment protection for
class-based distinctions is supported by existing case law, so long as
the Bearden line of cases is developed and, more particularly, ex-
panded. If so, then the longstanding concern that the Fourteenth
Amendment insufficiently protects class may be relaxed.
One goal of this Article is to caution courts to examine the con-
nection between equal protection and due process claims carefully.
When courts examine cumulative constitutional rights, “they should
be clear about what interests are mutually reinforcing or not, why,
and how this affects the analysis or the scrutiny.”316 Both outcomes
and remedies are affected by whether courts consider both the
equality and process dimensions of equal process claims.317 In an era
of rising income inequality, equal process claims may have an
important role to play. Hopefully, courts will correctly develop these
claims and the resulting remedies to ensure that all persons enjoy
both equality and due process. Equal process theory has the po-
tential to reinvigorate the Fourteenth Amendment as a guardian
against discrimination that increases inequality in society.
314. See supra Part II.
315. See ABA, supra note 305, at 5.
316. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 28, at 1355.
317. See supra Part III.
